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Abstract 
 
Both rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and communicate their opinions to 
investors. Empirical evidence indicates that stock prices react to both bond rating changes (at least downgrades) 
and changes in analysts’ earning forecasts, suggesting that both pieces of information are valuable to investors.  
While most academic research has been focused on studying the impact of rating actions on bond prices, stock 
returns or earning forecasts, surprisingly, the relationship between target prices and rating actions has remained 
essentially unexplored.  
Our study contribute to the existing literature by providing an evidence, not yet explored, of any anticipation in 
target prices revision prior to a rating actions, in order to analyze the ability of equity analysts to predict the 
decisions of the main rating agencies. Moreover, our work is related to the empirical literature that investigates the 
optimism of analysts’ recommendations and we provide evidence about the mean target price to current price ratio 
for the Italian market. Using a large and unique database, we find that TP/P ratio over the period 2000-2005 
is 1,15, that is target prices are 15% higher than current stock prices. 
The motivation of this research stems from the empirical evidences that 1) target prices are statements incorporating 
earnings forecasts, which have proven to be meaningfully correlated with rating actions1,2) target prices revisions 
are released much more frequently than rating actions 3) downgrades (upgrades) associated with negative (positive) 
revision of the firm’s prospective cash flows will negatively(positively) affect bondholders and, to a larger extent, 
equity holders who have secondary claims compared to debt.  
On the basis of a set of hypotheses, we expect that downgrades can be anticipated by a reduction in target prices 
and that, in the case of upgrades, the anticipation effect should be more evident.  
Changes in target prices prior to rating actions are estimated, controlling for the anticipations through watches and 
the sector of the rated firm. 
Using a complete and unique data set of rating actions released by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch from 
1st January 2000 to 31st December 2005, for the Italian listed firms and for an European sample, we find that 
positive rating events are anticipated by consistent increases of the target prices released in the four months before 
the rating action. The evidence is less clear for negative rating events, since significant reductions in target prices are 
observable only in a shorter window (three months). Our results reflect analysts’ overly-optimistic behavior and the 
fact that they are less likely to reduce than to increase target prices over time.  
Results also differ controlling by the sector. Looking at the Italian sample (composed mainly by financial firms) 
and at the European financial sub sample we find that: target prices reduction prior to a downgrade is highly 
evident in the financial sector while it is not clear at all for the non financial sector. According to Gropp and 
Richards (2001) and Schweitzer et al. (1992), we thus observe strong differences between the two groups of issuers 
(financial and industrial ones). We argue that the different regulatory regimes, which imply different degrees of 
transparency, could explain the asymmetric behavior of target prices. 
We finally investigate whether the anticipation of a rating action by a watch list in the same direction, may 
influence our results. In this paper, we follow Hand et al. [1992] and use credit watches in two ways. First, we 
examine changes in target prices around credit watches, testing whether they contain relevant market information. 
Second, we use them as a means of distinguishing between contaminated and uncontaminated ratings changes. As 
in Hand et al. [1992] we argue that a ratings change that is preceded by a ratings watch in the same direction 
should be largely anticipated and, hence, should be associated with significant changes in target prices. 
Comparing the average change in target price for contaminated versus uncontaminated rating actions, we find that 
contaminated downgrades show more pronounced reductions in target price over time while there is no significant 
difference for upgrades. This difference can be explained according to whether or not the watch list was released 
during the four months prior to the rating action, corresponding to our observation window. Since watch lists are 
                                                 
1 Goh and Ederington, “Bond rating agencies and stock analysts: who knows what when”, 1998. 
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usually released on average three months before the downgrade, they fall into our observation window, bringing 
with them a further reduction in target price. 
Overall, the results suggest that target prices may perform a useful role in anticipating rating changes and confirm 
prior evidence that rating actions can be predicted from publicly available information, at least for financial sector. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 1 discusses the main informational content of ratings, 
rating criteria and procedures. Following that, in Chapter 2, we examine the main content of reports on Italian 
stocks, to find out the evaluation method used to get the final recommendation and the main differences between 
analysts’ justifications for reports that disclose target prices versus those that do not. The different disclosure levels 
of target prices across stock recommendations suggest that analysts are more inclined to provide them when their 
recommendations are more favorable (i.e., Buy or Strong Buy) than they are when their recommendations are less 
favorable (i.e., Hold). 
Finally, in Chapter 3, we investigate whether ratings actions can be predicted from publicly available information 
by examining any target price changes prior to the rating action, on the basis of a set of hypotheses to be tested. 
The research design and methodology are described in Chapter 3, along with the main conclusions of the empirical 
evidence. 
The work closes with a summary and suggestions for future research. 
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Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we try to explore the practices of international rating agencies and stock analysts 
in order to build a theoretical basis to understand whether rating actions can be predicted from 
publicly available information by examining any target prices changes prior to the rating action.  
Worldwide, there are numerous rating agencies providing credit ratings, however, the industry 
counts only three major players: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s) 
and Fitch Ratings (Fitch). 
Rating agencies assigns two types of credit ratings—one to corporate issuers and the other to 
individual corporate debt issues (or other financial obligations). The first type is called a 
corporate credit rating. It is a current opinion on an issuer’s overall capacity to pay its financial 
obligations—i.e., its fundamental creditworthiness. This opinion focuses on the issuer’s ability 
and willingness to meet its financial commitments on a timely basis. It generally indicates the 
likelihood of default regarding all financial obligations of the company, because, in most 
countries, companies that default on one debt type or file under the Bankruptcy Code virtually 
always stop payment on all debt types.  
Generally, a corporate credit rating is published for all companies that have issue ratings, in 
addition to those companies that have no ratable issues, but request just an issuer rating.  
Rating agencies also assigns credit ratings to specific issues. In fact, the vast majority of credit 
ratings pertain to specific debt issues. Issue ratings are a blend of default risk (sometimes 
referred to as “timeliness”) and the recovery prospects associated with the specific debt being 
rated.  
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1.1 International rating methodologies 
 
This section will look at a typical rating process and the methodological tools used by the rating 
agencies in assessing the borrowers. It is not an exhaustive treatment but it should help to 
explain their modus operandi. 
A credit rating is an opinion of the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other 
obligor to make full and timely payments on principal and interests due to investors2. 
Rating agencies attempt to assess the probability that an issuer will meet its debt service 
obligations. The policy of Moody’s and S&P, the largest U.S. rating agencies, is to rate all 
issues/issuer that may interest their client. The assessed creditworthiness is reported by assigning 
one of the following symbols: 
 
Table 1.1:  Long tern issuer credit rating scale 
Table 1.1
Fitch/S&P Moody's Issuer’s creditworthiness
AAA Aaa Excellent
AA+ Aa1
AA Aa2 Very good
AA- Aa3
A+ A1
A A2 Good
A- A3
BBB+ Baa1
BBB Baa2 Sufficient
BBB- Baa3
BB+ Ba1
BB Ba2 Unsufficient
BB- Ba3
B+ B1
B B2 Low
B- B3
CCC+ Caa1
CCC Caa2
CCC- Caa3 Very low
CC Ca
C C
D/SD D/SD Default/Junk bond
Long-term issuer credit rating scale
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2 Definition provided by Moody’s. 
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A key feature of ratings is that they contain a limited number of categories. Hence, equally rated 
bonds are not claimed to be of identical quality and ratings cannot be inverted into unique 
default probabilities.  
Ratings are intended to be comparable across different industry groupings (and across 
countries), although the underlying assessments can vary considerably from industry sector to 
sector. There are many specialized sectors in the rating business, but we will look at two of the 
main traditional areas of rated entities: banks (more in general financial institutions) and 
corporations. 
A typical credit rating procedure begins with the analysis of the issuer’s environment. This 
depends on the nature of the issuer itself, for instance banks operate within a regulatory 
framework and risk flows from capitalisation and asset quality; corporations are characterised by 
issues such as cash flow and industry sector positioning. The analysis typically compares the 
issuer’s financial statements to other players in its peer group. Alternatively, the agency may 
contact the issuer after the new issue’s registration with the SEC.  
In recent years, rating agencies have begun to attach modifiers to some of their coarse ratings. In 
1973, two ratings agencies, S&P and Fitch, gradually began to refine their ratings by dividing 
them into three sub ratings: a plus (minus) sign modifies the most (least) creditworthy sub rating; 
no modifier is attached to the middle sub rating. Moody’s refined its ratings in a special edition 
of its monthly Bond Record, issued on April 26, 1982, announcing the attachment of numerical 
modifiers to its ratings. Moody’s rating modifiers are “1” for the best sub rating, “2” for the 
middle sub rating, and “3” for the worst sub rating. As opposed to the Fitch and S&P gradual 
refinement, Moody’s attached all the modifiers at once: the special edition of Moody’s Bond 
Record refined its regular report of March 31, 1982, by adding modifiers to all previously 
announced ratings. The regular report sent to Moody’s subscribers on April 30, 1982 included 
the rating modifiers, as do all subsequent reports.  
After laying the groundwork of background research and peer group analysis, the agency will 
typically have a list of questions needing further clarification. This checklist is a guide to help 
orient the review and will rarely be answered in its entirety. The checklist are organised by 
section: for example Moody’s uses the acronym CAMEL (Capital, assets, Management, Earnings 
and Liquidity) to analyse banks. Corporations in turn may be organised by industries issues, cash 
flows forecasts, debt servicing and management strategy. At this stage the agency may request 
for data which are considered by the rated company in question to be confidential, and the 
agency may in turn be required to sign a confidentiality agreement. 
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Meetings with the issuer’s management form part of the rating process. They usually include 
discussions to assess the data provided and seek further clarification. This will typically be with 
the issuer’s CFO. The length and number of meetings depend on the complexity of the entity 
being rated. 
The main areas the rating agencies will focus on will obviously be defined by the nature of the 
entity in question. In the case of a bank, this will be in areas such as lending, investments, fund 
management, OBS transactions (particularly derivatives), interest rate and currency risk. The 
analysis will also look at the bank’s prospects and the relationship with and likely support from 
its owners. Corporate analysis will focus on market positioning, cash flow, steady profitability, 
sustainable earnings, and adequate cushions to ensure debt servicing in case of adversity; rating 
analysts look favourably on consistency and diversity of earnings and profitability. 
Following the meeting with its management and subsequent analysis of data obtained, the 
analyst will draft a rating report. Some agencies send the draft report to the issuer so that its 
accuracy can be checked and confidential items can be removed. The next step is to transmit the 
report to the agency’s rating committee, that votes to define the rating. During the credit 
committee meeting, the analysts may also present relevant confidential data, omitted from the 
report to preserve confidentiality. The quorums and the required majorities vary from agency to 
agency, but the votes are typically not secret. 
In the event that the issuer accepts the rating, the rating report and the ratings will then be 
publicly released via various publications and communications such as the internet, wire services 
and press release. Some agencies will respect the confidentiality of the client; if the issuer does 
not want the rating published then the project will be terminated and nobody will be informed 
that rating work was done on the issuer in question. One may wonder how this fits into 
“investor service”. 
 
1.2 Corporate credit ratings 
 
Corporate rating is aimed at providing investors with a relative indication of the ability of an 
issuer of a fixed-interest security to repay interest and capital on the security on time and in full.  
The process reflects a review of the key underlying strengths and weaknesses of the company 
being rated and is typically based five years’ past financial data, plus sector information, 
management forecasts and discussion of future performance and strategic direction. 
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The rating methodology for industrial companies may be segmented in two broad areas: 
business risk and financial risk. Business risk is a qualitative risk whereas financial risk is a 
quantitative risk. A short-term rating involves mainly those factors affecting the immediate 
financial outlook, such as liquidity, asset conversion cycle and assurance of near-term 
performance; a longer-term view looks at qualitative elements: 
? Country risk/Industry environment 
? Volatility and outlook 
? The entity’s market position 
? Management’s ability 
? Accounting quality 
? Historical an forecast financial results 
? Revenue structure and earnings protection 
? Operating efficiency 
? Cash flows and financial flexibility 
? Capital structure 
 
Country/Industry risk. For issuers whose operations are centred on OECD countries, country 
risk will not adversely impact the rating level. The geographic and national importance of a 
particular industry in a country, in terms of employment, contribution to GDP or exports, or 
providing work to subsidiary industries, is a factor considered in the rating process. The 
relationship with government is also examined. 
Certain industries are more risky and volatile, and ratings need to reflect this. An industry in 
decline may adversely affect a corporation’s long term rating. Other factors such as expensive 
entry barriers, competitive structure of the industry, scope for competitive changes, cyclical 
behaviour, R&D needs, and capital spending cycles are covered in the rating process. Important 
industry developments and trends are discussed with companies to assess their likely effect on 
future performance. 
Market position and operating environment. The rating agency will want to get a feel for the 
relative importance (as measured by sales and share in key markets) of a company’s ability to 
influence price, achieve product dominance, maintain reputation, and resist competitive 
pressures. Size may give entity major advantages in terms of nationwide supply, distribution, 
advertising, and competitive position. The structural analysis will encompass aspect such as 
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product diversity, geographic spread of sales and production, significance of major customers, 
reliance on particular suppliers, availability of alternatives, control over distribution, industrial 
relations record, and potential for external events to influence the business. Classic risk analysis 
elements will be undertaken, such as SWOT analyses. 
Management. Assessing management is highly subjective exercise; it can be based o the close 
monitoring of press cuttings as well as the agency’s experience in having made previous 
assessments. Management risk will become evident in the company’s operational and financial 
history, trend and record, and is an integral part of the assessment of risk; it is therefore rarely a 
factor in its own right. Although evaluation of a firm’s management is necessarily subjective and 
may properly be carried out only over a period of time as results against planned goals are 
considered, past financial performance provides an element of objective assessment of past 
management performance. Management’s corporate aims are considered, alongside those of 
peers, to better appreciate their strategic motivation, attitude toward risk, and awareness of the 
industry environment. 
Financial Risk. Analysing financial statements and projections form an integral part of the 
credit review. The rating decision may be heavily influenced by financial measures and cash flow 
forecasting. 
Accounting quality. This aspect is covered by looking at the accounting policies, including 
consolidation principles, valuation policies, depreciation methods, income recognition, reserving 
policies, pension provisions, goodwill treatment, changes in the group structure, and OBS items 
such as leasing and borrowings in unconsolidated entities. The aim is to arrive at a conclusion on 
the overall conservatism or creativity of the accounting presentation and to decide what 
adjustments may be necessary in order to restate the figures using a basis comparable with other 
corporations in the same industry. 
Earnings and cash flows. Earnings are the key element in the overall financial health of an 
entity. The analysis will focus on the consistency and trend of core earnings, and earning mix by 
activity and geography, the occurrence of exceptional and extraordinary items and their impact 
on past earning levels, and the true earnings available for cash flow. 
Rating agencies are typically interested in stability and diversity of the cash flow stream, usually 
obtained from the company’s annual report breakdown of the company’s activity by sector. 
Companies often provide their own management-prepared cash flow forecasts; they are typically 
impossible to reconcile with the company’s audited statements and are exercises I hopeful “what 
if” scenarios. Some agencies work off those forecasts instead of actually spreading the 
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company’s audited statements and subsequently calculating their own cash flow forecasts. In any 
case, some effort is made to focus o continuing flows from the company’s major business 
activities and understanding to what extent they can be expected to be sustainable over time. 
The task, however, can be difficult if the company is less than transparent in providing 
information. The point of analysing cash flow is to assess the company’s ability to finance its 
present and projected business from internally generated cash flow. The agency will look at the 
adequacy of cash flow to maintain the operating capacity of the business, the working capital 
levels, and the replacement of fixed assets. The volatility of cash flow will also be assessed and 
the analysis will seek to identify any restriction on cash flow (limits on repatriation and blocked-
funds overseas, potential taxation effects, access to dividends from the subsidiaries) which may 
exist or constrain the group’s operational flexibility. 
Ratios show the relationship of cash flow to debt and debt service, and also to the company’s 
needs. Because there are calls on cash other than repaying debt, it is important to know the 
extent to which those requirements will allow cash to be used for debt service or, alternatively, 
lead to greater need for borrowing. 
Some of the specific ratios considered are: 
? Funds from operations/total debt (adjusted for off-balance-sheet liabilities); 
? Debt/EBITDA; 
? EBITDA/interest; 
? Free operating cash flow + interest/interest; 
? Free operating cash flow + interest/interest + annual principal repayment obligation 
           (debt-service coverage); 
? Total debt/discretionary cash flow (debt payback period); 
? Funds from operations/capital spending requirements, and 
? Capital expenditures/capital maintenance. 
 
Where long-term viability is more assured (i.e., higher in the rating spectrum) there can be 
greater emphasis on the level of funds from operations and its relation to total debt burden. 
These measures clearly differentiate between levels of protection over time. Focusing on debt 
service coverage and free cash flow becomes more critical in the analysis of a weaker company. 
Speculative grade issuers typically face near-term vulnerabilities, which are better measured by 
free cash flow ratios. Interpretation of these ratios is not always straightforward; higher values 
can sometimes indicate problems rather than strength. 
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A company serving a low-growth or declining market may exhibit relatively strong free cash 
flow, because of minimal fixed and working capital needs. Growth companies, in comparison, 
often exhibit thin or even negative free cash flow because investment is needed to support 
growth. For the low-growth company, credit analysis weighs the positives of strong current cash 
flow against the danger that this high level of protection might not be sustainable. For the high-
growth company, the problem is just the opposite: weighing the negatives of a current cash 
deficit against prospects of enhanced protection once current investment begins yielding cash 
benefits. 
There is no simple correlation between creditworthiness and the level of current cash flow. 
 
Measuring cash flow 
Discussions about cash flow often suffer from lack of uniform definition of terms. 
Table 1.2 illustrates for example Standard & Poor’s terminology with respect to specific cash 
flow concepts. At the top is the item from the funds flow statement usually labelled “funds from 
operations” (FFO) or “working capital from operations” This quantity is net income adjusted 
for depreciation and other no cash debits and credits factored into it. Back out the changes in 
working capital investment to arrive at “operating cash flow.” Next, capital expenditures and 
cash dividends are subtracted out to arrive at “free operating cash flow” and “discretionary cash 
flow,” respectively. Finally, cost of acquisitions is subtracted from the running total, proceeds 
from asset disposals added, and other miscellaneous sources and uses of cash netted together. 
“Prefinancing cash flow” is the end result of these computations, which represents the extent to 
which company cash flow from all internal sources has been sufficient to cover all internal 
needs. The bottom part of the table reconciles prefinancing cash flow to various categories of 
external financing and changes in the company’s own cash balance. 
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Table 1.2: Cash flow summary 
 
 
 
Capital and debt structure. The company’s capital structure and ownership will influence 
dividend payments and will be accordingly assessed in light of historical levels of dividend 
payments. Obviously, the company’s position either as a quoted entity, subsidiary, or private 
company will have a significant effect on its dividend policy. 
The rating agency will assess leverage and interest coverage ratios in order to appreciate the 
relative risk profile of different companies as regards their reliance on external finance. Capital 
structure may differ due to the characteristics of local capital markets, the relationship between 
banks and industrial corporations, taxation treatment of dividends, interests, and so on. Capital 
structure similarly differs across industries; a supermarket will not have the same capital structure 
and financial position as an aircraft manufacturer. The company’s equity base relative to its 
ongoing operations and OBS borrowings will be assessed, especially where partly-own entities or 
non-consolidated subsidiaries exist, since this may at times involve claims on the parent 
company. The structure of debt will also be examined, including its type, maturity schedule, 
currency, and relationship with providers. Seasonal factors may also distort year-end figures for 
borrowings and therefore affect the leverage and other measures. The analysis should also look 
at how hedging instruments are used as tools to manage risk (not for speculation).  
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Funding and liquidity. Rating agencies look favourably on low leverage. The financial 
flexibility of a firm is its ability to carry out its planned activities even in times of difficulty 
without hindering credit quality. The agency may also look to see if the issuer maintains adequate 
banking relationships, other financing options, or the ability to access equity markets, as well as 
any restrictive covenants on existing financing facilities that may limit its field of action. Major 
holdings from long-standing, supportive, and financially strong shareholders could represent a 
positive feature. 
Group structure. The strength, status, and financial position of the owners of the entity, their 
relationship with it, the autonomy or degree of control exercised, any benefits or disadvantages 
associated with the ownership, all are reviewed. Structure of ownership is clearly important: A 
group with a pyramid structure of partly owned associates, for instance, invariably gives the 
impression of being financially stronger than it is in realty: the group equity may be inadequate 
for the level of debt. 
Backup policies. An important consideration is a rating assessment is adequate alternative 
liquidity. Sources of such liquidity include cash and equivalents which are immediately realisable 
and accessible, unused committed bank lines, or other available facilities. The necessary 
composition of backup liquidity will vary from one issuer to another; important determinants 
will be the company’s overall risk profile, debt structure, fluctuation in borrowings, and planned 
short-term financing levels. 
 
1.3 Banks credit ratings 
 
Banks operating in free market economies are in most ways like other business entities, but there 
are significant differences; even the most liberalised administrations in the least regulated market 
economies may on occasion hesitate before standing aside to allow the failure of a bank: the 
authorities usually rescue the banks because their first goal is to maintain the confidence in the 
banking system. Thus, a particularly important factor to be taken into account when rating banks 
is the presence (or possibly absence) of a lender/rescuer of last resort, and a very important part 
of the analytical work is an attempt to assess whether, and under what circumstances, a bank 
would be supported, and by whom. 
The classic approach to bank analysis can be facilitated by placing it within a framework which 
Moody’s has summarised with the acronym CAMEL (Table 1.3). The CAMEL approach 
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basically emphasizes the principal aspects of concern in assessing a bank’s stability. Although 
there is a tendency of viewing the CAMEL elements as independent, these elements should be 
viewed as interrelated variables in assessing a bank’s overall safety and soundness. 
 
Table 1.3: CAMEL framework 
Capital Strong capital base
High capital adequacy ratio
High quality shareholders
Asset quality Diversification of loan portfolio
No excessive loan growth
Return on loan appropriate to risk
Good, clearly stated credit policy
Low/adequate provisions
Country risk spread well
Management Managemet experienced
Honesty and integrity
Well-regulated environment
Good spread of tecnical and management
skills
Clear and logical strategy
Size and market reputation
Well-trained staff
Good internal/external communication
Long-term relationships
Competitive rates
High-quality service
Earnings ROA and ROE
Stable income stream; little exceptional
items
Good trend and track record of profits
Controlled expense/income ratio
High dividend payout potential
Liquidity Stable customer base
Loans and funding well matched
Good liquidity
Table 1.2     The CAMEL framework
Source: Moody's  
 
Capital. Capital adequacy or solvency is the measure to which a financial institution’s portfolio 
and business risks are adequately offset with risk capital available to absorb potential losses. A 
high level of capital can help an institution ride out a protracted downside cycle, adopt more 
aggressive strategies, and take larger risks with the possibility of larger returns, whereas a low 
level of capital reduces management’s decisional flexibility. Capital adequacy is also important 
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because it is the primary measure by which regulatory authorities gauge an institution’s financial 
health. 
Asset quality. Asset quality is the most important and the most difficult element of bank 
analysis, as it is highly subjective or opaque, as various studies have suggested. The majority of 
bank failures are due to poor quality of risk assets. The greatest risk in having exposure to a bank 
is that it can have substantial unrecognized asset quality problems which are not apparent in its 
accounts and which could eventually crystallise and cause it to fail. 
The main difficulty in assessing a bank’s asset quality is due to the fact that accounting is by 
nature an activity whose assessments are subjective; this is especially true when assessing the 
quality of loans which may not be experiencing difficulties at the time of the audit. Furthermore, 
management allocations of provisions for potential loan losses, based on experience, are 
inherently subjective and therefore difficult to assess. The analyst’s ability to assess a bank’s asset 
quality based on financial statement is equally subjective. 
Liquidity.  Asset-liability management is an important element of the overall assessment of the 
bank’s soundness. This involves analysing liquidity and interest rate sensitivity. Illiquidity is often 
the primary factor in a bank’s failure, whereas high liquidity can help a otherwise weak institution 
to remain funded during a period of difficulty. Liquidity is therefore important, especially in 
assessing smaller banks, or banks which may not have a large depositor base and are obliged to 
fund themselves on the inter bank markets. This is best measured by the degree to which core 
assets are funded by core liabilities. 
Earning and Management. For these aspects see the Corporate Rating Criteria. 
 
In any case, it is useful to consider the nature of the banking business in order to recognize 
different kinds of risk that a bank faces before we look at the agencies’ methodologies. The most 
important risks, evaluated by a rating agency to the extent that they can affect the 
creditworthiness of a bank, are: (a) lending and other counterparty’s risk, (b) investment and 
securities risk, (c) administration of fiduciary fund risk, (d) interest rate and currency risk, (e) 
derivative risk, (f) funding risk, (g) performance and earning risk. 
 
Sample bank rating checklist 
For the analysis of asset quality rating agencies will ask, for instance, a breakdown of the bank’s 
loan portfolio, in terms of economic sector, country risk and currency. Further information 
relating to the breakdown between secured and unsecured lending, and particular concentration 
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of exposures to single entities will be investigated. Agencies are naturally interested in seeing 
formalised procedures for defining credit approvals and defining exposure limits. These credit 
policy inquiries will assume more detailed inquiry in areas such as whether the bank uses credit 
scoring techniques for evaluating consumer or mortgage lending, or other credit grading systems 
for other types of lending. Agencies will also want to understand how the bank imposes limits 
on loans to individual borrowers, who sets this limits, who can alter them and for what reasons. 
Queries will be made regarding how the bank defines and assesses doubtful and/or non 
performing credits; this naturally leads to inquiries on how much, if at all, the bank has allocated 
loan loss provisions. Finally, the rating agency will want to understand how the bank manages its 
problem loan management process, and understand how the bank ensures maximum recovery 
on loans that have gone bad. 
The agency will then want to look at a breakdown of trading and investment securities 
portfolios, distinguishing between types of securities. Explanations regarding portfolio valuation 
policies and policies for managing investment risk will be looked at. 
If the bank administers fiduciary funds or deposits, the rating agency will want to see details such 
as their totals, by country and by currency, and to know how they are invested; although these 
funds are legally at the client’s risk, the rating agency needs to know whether the bank ever 
reimburses clients for losses incurred on them. 
The next step will be, for example, the assessment of the bank’s interest rate and currency 
sensitivity. Attention will focus on the degree to which mismatches are allowed, how the policy 
is implemented, and how successful it has been. 
For banks active in derivatives, rating agencies may have specific assessment questionnaires. 
The agency will want to understand the principal sources and likely volatility of a bank’s funding. 
They will be particularly interested I knowing how dependent the bank is on any major 
shareholders. For bank borrowing, a breakdown of the concentrations, currencies and countries 
of origin of the lenders of such borrowing will be asked. 
Information on the development of the bank’s net interest revenue and net interest margins, the 
breakdown of fees and commissions by type, details of operating expenses, extraordinary 
income and expenses, and so on, will be required. 
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1.4 Factoring Cyclicality into Corporate Ratings 
 
Credit ratings are meant to be forward-looking, and their time horizon extends as far as is 
analytically foreseeable. 
Accordingly, the anticipated ups and downs of business cycles—whether industry-specific or 
related to the general economy—should be factored into the credit rating all along. 
Ratings should never be a mere snapshot of the present situation. Accordingly, ratings are held 
constant throughout the cycle, or, alternatively, the rating does vary—but within a relatively 
narrow band. 
Cyclicality is, of course, a negative incorporated in the assessment of a company’s business risk. 
The degree of business risk, in turn, becomes the basis for establishing ratio standards for a 
given company for a given rating category. The analysis then focuses on a company’s ability to 
meet these levels, on average, over a full business cycle and the extent to which it may deviate 
and for how long. The ideal is to rate “through the cycle.” There is no point in assigning high 
ratings to a company enjoying peak prosperity if that performance level is expected to be only 
temporary. 
Similarly, there is no need to lower ratings to reflect poor performance as long as one can 
reliably anticipate that better times are just around the corner. However, rating through the cycle 
requires an ability to predict the cyclical pattern—usually, difficult to do. The phases of a cycle 
probably will be longer or shorter, steeper or less severe, than just repetitions of earlier cycles. 
Interaction of cycles from different parts of the globe and the convergence of secular and 
cyclical forces are further complications. 
Moreover, even predictable cycles can affect individual companies in ways that have a lasting 
impact on credit quality. For example, a company may accumulate enough cash in the upturn to 
mitigate the risks of the next downturn. Conversely, a company’s business can be so impaired 
during a downturn that its competitive position may be permanently altered. In the extreme, a 
company will not survive a cyclical downturn to participate in the upturn! 
Accordingly, ratings may well be adjusted with the phases of a cycle. Normally, however, the 
range of the ratings would not fully mirror the amplitude of the company’s cyclical highs or 
lows, given the expectation that a cyclical pattern will persist. The expectation of change from 
the current performance level—for better or worse—would temper any rating action. In most 
cases, then, the typical relationship of ratings and cycles might look more like that below. 
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Sensitivity to cyclical factors—and ratings stability—also varies considerably along the rating 
spectrum. As the credit quality of a company becomes increasingly marginal, the nature and 
timing of near-term changes in market conditions could mean the difference between survival 
and failure. A cyclical downturn may involve the threat of default before the opportunity to 
participate in the upturn that may follow. In such situations, cyclical fluctuations usually will lead 
directly to rating changes—possibly, even several rating changes in a relatively short period. 
Conversely, a cyclical upturn may give companies a breather that may warrant a modest upgrade 
or two from those very low levels. 
In contrast, companies viewed as having strong fundamentals—i.e., those enjoying investment-
grade ratings—are unlikely to see their ratings changed significantly because of factors deemed 
to be purely cyclical, unless the cycle is either substantially different from what was anticipated 
or the company’s performance is somehow exceptional relative to what had been expected. 
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1.5 Watchlist 
 
In addition to outright changes in ratings, Hand et al. [1992] have stressed that it is important to 
also consider the information contained in the “credit watch list.” Companies are added to the 
credit watch list, if the rating agency believes that a rating change is likely. This information is 
supplemented by the expected direction of the change, e.g. there may be “indicated upgrades”, 
“indicated downgrades” or “developing.” The credit watch would indicate “developing,” if a 
ratings change of unknown direction is likely.  
In 1985 Moody’s began to publish regularly a schedule of all ratings currently under review, and 
labelled it the “watchlist”. From October 1991 onwards, the watchlist was considered a formal 
rating action, i.e. a rating committee decides about watchlist placement and watchlist resolution3. 
The purpose of the watchlist is to indicate a likely change in the company rating. Reasons for 
initiating a watchlist process might be that the company has announced a major event 
(investment decision, market shock), but it is unclear whether this will be realized or not (e.g., 
the case of merger in the Constellation Brands Inc. example); or a sudden change in credit 
quality takes place, but the extent of the change is unknown4. 
                                                 
3 See Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998), p. 3. 
 
4 In 1985 Moody’s began to publish regularly a schedule of all ratings currently under review, and labelled it the ‘watchlist’. From 
October 1991 onwards, the watchlist was considered a formal rating action, i.e. a rating committee decides about watchlist 
placement and watchlist resolution. 
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In both cases, the firm may be placed on the watchlist. Watchlist placements are accompanied by 
preliminary estimates of the rating direction, i.e. designation ‘downgrade’, ‘unchanged’ or 
‘upgrade’. Given the nature of the event that leads to watchlist additions, direction unchanged is 
not as often used as the other two, and so we will not consider it further in the paper. 
During the watchlist interval, the rating agency requests information from the firm, thereby 
entering into a dialog. At the end of the watchlist period, the rating is removed from watchlist 
and concurrently designated as downgrade, upgrade or confirmation. If the firm is placed on the 
watchlist with designation downgrade, the watchlist resolution will be either a downgrade or no 
change at all (a confirmation). The rating may also be upgraded as a consequence of the 
watchlist process but such reversals are not common. Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998) report 
that less than 1% of the watchlist resolutions are such reversals. The ratio between rating change 
and confirmation depends on the placement direction: in the downgrade (upgrade) case, the 
ratio is roughly 65% (75%) changes and 25% (15%) confirmations. There is actually less than 
one reversal in one thousand rating actions, implying that the initial watchlist designation puts a 
strong prior on the eventual rating action. 
The length of the watchlist is set on a case-by-case basis. Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998) report 
that the mean watchlist takes 103 days to be completed. The 10% (90%) quantile takes 22 (95) 
days to be completed for firms that are placed on watchlist with designation downgrade. For 
firms entering the watchlist with designation upgrade, the mean is 115 days with 21 (218) as the 
10% (90%) quantile. However, we take from these results that the duration of the watchlist 
monitoring period is an important decision variable of the rating agency. The monitoring 
process will be ended once the agency concludes that it has collected sufficient information to 
assess the firm’s default risk prospects. Note that during the monitoring period, the firm 
attempts to convince the agency of its high credit quality, possibly complying with the standards 
defined by the agency. Whether the required standards have been met, and in particular, at what 
point in time this is achieved, remains a surprise to the market. 
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Chapter 2 
The informational content of target prices  
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2.1   Sell-side analysts: understanding their work 
 
The analyst’s job is to provide target prices and recommendations and to provide research 
reports to support those prices and those recommendations. 
A sell-side analyst works for a brokerage or a firm that manages individual accounts and 
evaluates companies for future earnings growth and other investment criteria. Sell-side analysts 
are those who issue the target prices and the often-heard recommendations of strong buy, buy, 
hold, sell or strong sell. These recommendations help clients make decisions to buy or sell certain 
stocks. This is beneficial for the brokerage because every time a client makes a decision to trade 
stock, the brokerage gets a commission on the transactions.   
This is not to say that sell-side analysts recommend or change their opinion on a stock just to 
create transactions. However, it is important to realize that these analysts are paid by and 
ultimately answer to the brokerage, not the clients. Furthermore, the recommendations of a sell-
side analyst are called "blanket recommendations" because they're not directed at any one client, 
but rather at the general mass of the investors. These recommendations are inherently broad 
and, as a result, they may be inappropriate for certain investment strategies. When considering a 
sell-side recommendation, it's important to determine whether the recommendation suits the 
individual investment style. This is to say that since recommendations are generic comments that 
do not apply to every investor, investors can make better investment decisions by focusing 
instead on target prices. Target prices are the prices that the stock analyst expects a security to 
achieve in a certain time period (usually 12 months).  
Sell-side analysts presumably derive stock recommendations based on their own valuations of 
stocks. Accepting the standard wording of recommendations, investors would expect that a Buy 
or Strong Buy recommendation indicates a stock that the analyst believes is currently 
underpriced, a Hold recommendation indicating a fairly priced stock, and a Sell recommendation 
indicating an overpriced stock. However, Sell recommendations are virtually nonexistent (Stickel 
1998). Consequently, savvy investors might interpret Holds as essentially Sells and Buys as 
Holds5. 
However, would an analyst disclose a target price when he or she believes a company is 
overvalued? This may not be likely if previously documented optimistic bias in forecasts and 
recommendations also describes target prices (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien 1997). Explanations 
for this optimistic bias include a desire by analysts to ‘curry favor with management’ (Francis and 
                                                 
5 Marketplace by Bloomberg, “When a “hold” rating actually means “sell”, Tuesday, December 4, 2007. 
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Philbrick 1993) and enhance investment banking relationships (Lin and McNichols 1998). To 
the extent that these incentives affect how analysts justify their recommendations, it is possible 
that there is an asymmetric use of target prices in support of stock recommendations. 
Most prior research related to analysts’ ability to identify mispriced stocks focuses on the stock 
recommendation, rather the analysts’ valuations per se. For example, Womack (1996) documents 
significant market reactions to the release of analysts’ recommendations, suggesting investors 
believe recommendations are valuation relevant. However, Bradshaw (2001) uses analysts’ 
earnings forecasts as inputs into a residual income model, and finds that resulting valuations are 
unable to explain the associated stock recommendations, despite evidence that these valuations 
identify mispriced stocks (Frankel and Lee 1998). These findings suggest that analysts’ private 
valuations differ from those of a residual income model, but there is little empirical work 
examining the valuations that analysts do provide. 
Mark T. Bradshaw6 (2002) investigates a random sample of analysts’ reports to determine (i) how 
frequently analysts justify their recommendations with target prices, and (ii) when they do not 
use target prices, what they use instead. They randomly select 103 companies across all industries 
and acquire the most recent analyst report that includes a recommendation. Each report is read, 
and reasons for the recommendation are identified. Analysts disclose target prices in roughly 
two-thirds of the reports, and the tendency to disclose a target price is greater for more 
favourable recommendations.  
The different disclosure levels of target prices across stock recommendations suggests that 
analysts are more inclined to provide them when their recommendations are more favourable 
(i.e., Buy or Strong Buy) than they are when their recommendations are less favourable (i.e., 
Hold).  
Table 2.1  provides an analysis of the ratio of the target price to actual trading price (TP/P) for 
all reports with disclosed target prices. This ratio should be a measure of perceived over- or 
undervaluation by the analyst, and it is expected that more favourable recommendations are 
supported by higher values for TP/P. Like the underlying stock recommendations, the target 
prices are quite optimistic with an overall mean (median) TP/P ratio of 1.36 (1.29). Thus, 
analysts’ mean (median) target prices for these companies are 36 percent (29 percent) above 
current trading prices. The minimum ratio of TP/P is 0.89 (a Hold), and the maximum is 2.46 (a 
Strong Buy). More interesting, there is a monotonic increase in TP/P across the 
                                                 
6 “The use of target prices to justify sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations”, 2002. 
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recommendation categories. TP/P is larger for Strong Buy than for Buy recommendations, and 
TP/P is larger for Buy than for Hold recommendations. 
Differences in TP/P between Hold and Buy recommendations are significant for both the mean 
and median. However, only the difference in the median TP/P between Buy and Strong Buy 
recommendations is statistically significant at conventional levels; the means are insignificantly 
different (p-value 0.1598). Overall, results in Table 2.1 are consistent with target prices, when 
disclosed, being a primary justification for stock recommendations. 
 
Table 2.1: Relative Optimism in Target Prices across Stock Recommendations 
 
 
Moreover, the distribution of the ratio of the target price to actual trading price at the date of the 
report is positively related to the favourableness of the recommendation, consistent with 
analysts’ recommendations reflecting the disclosed valuations. In addition to target prices, they 
find that analysts also justify recommendations using a number of other factors, with the average 
report containing two such justifications. Analysts appear to invoke non-financial factors more 
frequently when the underlying stock recommendation is less favourable (i.e., Hold).  
The most prevalent bases for recommendations other than target prices are price-to-earnings 
(P/E) ratios and forecasted long-term earnings growth rates. Moreover, analysts frequently base 
their target prices on a combination of these two constructs. Together the P/E ratio and 
expected growth form a ratio frequently cited in the investment community and referenced in 
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many of the surveyed reports, the PEG ratio, which is equal to the P/E ratio divided by the 
growth rate. 
Advocates of this ratio claim that a fairly valued stock should have a PEG ratio of one. 
Implicitly, PEG advocates are using a valuation heuristic that calculates a target price as the 
earnings per share forecast times the growth rate7. For the sample, Mark T. Bradshaw finds that 
PEG valuations are significantly related to analysts’ disclosed target prices and stock 
recommendations. However, using PEG-based valuations as a proxy for analysts’ undisclosed 
target prices, they found no analogous support for the recommendations in these reports. 
Supplemental tests suggest that analysts’ are less likely to disclose target prices when they are 
more uncertain about the forecasted earnings for the company. 
The evidence in this work is consistent with that in several prior studies. For example, Previts et 
al. (1994) analyzes the content of 479 analysts’ reports using the ‘Word Cruncher’ computer 
program to document information needs of analysts. They find extensive use of various 
accounting data in their reports, particularly historical and forecasted earnings. Similarly, 
Govindarajan (1980) performs a content analysis to document whether analysts focus more on 
earnings or cash flow, and finds an overwhelming focus on earnings. Another related study is 
Block (1999), who surveys financial analysts and asks which analytical techniques they use. 
Analysts responded that they rarely use present value techniques in equity valuation (almost half 
of the respondents stated that they ‘never’ used present value techniques). 
An understanding of how analysts value stocks is of interest to a broad audience, particularly 
given the recent increase in the availability of analyst data to individual investors. For example, 
some of the most popular websites are personal investment ones such as TheStreet.com, Yahoo! 
Finance, and The Motley Fool, all of which include analysts’ recommendations, target prices, 
and forecasts. An understanding of how analysts value and recommend stocks is of interest to 
the large number of current investors in the stock market. Moreover, accountants in particular 
will benefit from knowing how a group of sophisticated financial intermediaries utilizes 
accounting information. 
At the beginning of this chapter, we suggested the idea that research regarding analysts’ work 
tends to focus too narrowly on the statistical properties of forecasts, without considering the full 
                                                 
7 PEG is defined as the P/E ÷LTG, where LTG is the analysts’ projection of the three to five year annual growth rate in 
earnings per share stated in percent (i.e., times 100). Setting PEG equal to 1 and rearranging terms to solve for ‘P,’ the PEG ratio 
(coupled with the assumption that a value of 1 is ‘normal’) implies that price should equal E*LTG. 
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decision context and economic incentives that may affect those properties. This point sounds 
weird, since models producing the most accurate forecasts of an earning variable should also 
produce the best proxies for the market’s expectations, assuming market efficiency and assuming 
the research design correctly models the valuation implication of the earning variable. 
This section, then, reviews the role of earnings and other information in the broad context of 
the decision process analysts use to produce their research reports and target prices. Learning 
about the information analyst’s use and understanding analysts’ decision processes is no easy 
matter. Researches have used surveys to simply ask analysts how they process information or 
content analysis of analysts’ research reports to infer the information they rely upon to make 
forecasts; as opposed to the research methods mentioned above, archival studies potentially 
offer more general results, but they are limited in their ability to penetrate the black box 
containing analysts’ actual decision processes. The challenge is that analysts have a context-
specific task that is very difficult to model. 
Previs et al. (1994) examine about 500 sell-side analyst reports to ascertain the information that 
analysts apparently use to make decisions. The context of the reports suggested heavy analyst 
use of earnings-related information and a strategy of disaggregating firm-level information into 
segments beyond the desegregation level provided in GAAP-based segment reporting footnotes. 
The study also find evidence of substantial analyst effort to extract non-recurring items and 
focus on “core” or “adjusted” earnings as a basis for forecasting future earnings. The study also 
reports heavy reliance on management for information, emphasizing the intermediation role of 
financial analysts. Interestingly, the work shows that analysts prefer following firms with 
effective strategies for presenting smooth earnings streams. The paper reports that analysts most 
frequently refer to accounting earnings quality in terms of a company’s ability to manage 
earnings through the establishment and adjustment of conservative, discretionary reserves, 
allowances, and OBS assets, which provide analysts a low-risk earnings platform for making 
stock price forecasts and recommendations. 
Rogers and Grant (1997) extend Previs et al. by examining about 200 sell-side analyst reports 
issued between 1993 and 1994. They report that only about one half of the information in the 
research reports could be found in the corresponding corporate annual reports, consistent with 
the idea that analysts use also other external information. Further, even within the annual report 
about one half of the information seems to have been obtained from the narrative sections (for 
example the president’s letter) rather than the basic financial statements. Thus, examining analyst 
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reports based solely on quantitative information may not capture the complex nature of the 
analyst’s task. 
Research also suggest that analysts are more likely to cover firms that provide them with more 
(and better quality) information required for analysis. It is demonstrated that the quality of 
corporate disclosure (as rated by expert analyst committees) affect analysts’ coverage decisions 
and the accuracy of their forecasts. 
Bowen et al. (2002) find that the analysts’ forecast accuracy depends mostly the quality of 
managers’ disclosures, and that analysts’ reliance an management earning forecasts depends on 
the reliability of the forecast as measured by past management forecast accuracy. 
Thus, analysts appear to rely on detailed information in corporate reports, and their incentives to 
cover certain firms appear to be related to the quality of corporate disclosure. 
 
 
2.2 Evidence on earnings forecast accuracy and analysts’ valuation model choice 
 
“The analyst could do a more dependable and professional job of passing judgment on a common stock if he were 
able to determine some objective value, independent of the market quotation, with which he could compare the 
current price. He could then advise the investor to buy when price was substantially below value, and to sell when 
price exceeded value.” (Graham and Dodd, 1951: 404-405) 
 
Descriptions of the equity research process (e.g., Copeland, Koller, Murrin 2000; English 2001; 
Penman 2004) indicate that the profitability of a sell-side analyst’s stock recommendation 
depends on how well each of three tasks is performed: formulating accurate forecasts of 
earnings and other financial statement components; translating those forecasts into reliable 
valuation price targets; and then assigning a recommendation to the stock based on comparison 
of the stock’s current market price against the price target8. Success at one task does not 
guarantee success at the others. For example, an analyst skilled at forecasting earnings may use 
those superior forecasts as inputs to a flawed valuation model and thereby generate inferior price 
targets and buy/sell recommendations. Or the advantages of accurate earnings forecasts and 
price targets can be diminished when investment decisions are based solely on analysts’ buy/sell 
                                                 
8 A price target reflects the analyst’s opinion about what the stock is worth and thus presumably serves as the basis for the 
analyst’s stock recommendation. Adopting the standard nomenclature, a stock that the analyst believes is under priced in the 
marketplace (i.e., a stock for which the price target exceeds current market price) will be assigned a Buy or Strong Buy 
recommendation, a fairly priced stock will be assigned a Hold recommendation, and an overpriced stock will be assigned a Sell 
recommendation 
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recommendations and there are inefficiencies or biases in the recommendation assignment 
process. 
Empirical evidence on how sell-side analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy affects the profitability 
of price targets and recommendations is mixed. Bradshaw and Brown (2005) find that price 
target accuracy is unrelated to the (past) accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Loh and Mian 
(2006) and Ertimur et al. (2007), on the other hand, find that analysts who issue more accurate 
earnings forecasts also issue more profitable buy/sell recommendations. These studies provide 
an incomplete perspective on the relation among earnings forecast accuracy, price target 
performance and recommendation profitability because only two of the three factors are 
considered. Moreover, none of these studies consider how analysts’ valuation model choice 
affects their price target performance.  
Gleason at al (2007) simultaneously investigates the influence of earnings forecast accuracy and 
valuation model use on the profitability of analysts’ price targets. They predict and find that sell-
side analysts who formulate more accurate concurrent earnings forecasts also produce superior 
price targets. This result holds even after controlling for the previously documented relation 
between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability. They find that price 
targets are more useful for investment purposes than are buy/sell recommendations when 
earnings forecast accuracy is high. When earnings forecast accuracy is low, investors would be 
well advised to ignore analysts’ price targets and their recommendations.  
Their investigation extends recent work on earnings forecast accuracy and the profitability of 
analysts’ investment opinions (Loh and Mian 2006; Ertimur et al. 2007). If analysts’ stock 
recommendations are derived from their price targets as proscribed by textbook descriptions of 
the equity research process, the benefits of improved earnings forecast accuracy should first be 
evident in price target profitability. After all, price targets are a more granular measure for testing 
the profitability of analysts’ investment opinions because price targets provide an objective 
indication of the dollar profit potential from trading in recommended firms’ shares. This 
argument predicts that earnings forecast accuracy exerts a positive influence on price target 
profitability, and that investment decisions based on price targets yield higher profits than do 
those based on buy/sell recommendations alone. Bradshaw and Brown (2005), on the other 
hand, claim that analyst compensation increases in the accuracy of their earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations but not in the quality of their price targets, so rational analysts may 
expend less effort on distinguishing themselves through differential price target quality. If so, 
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price targets may serve other purposes such as to justify ex post analysts’ buy/sell 
recommendations.  
Their investigation also extends earlier research on analysts’ valuation model use that points to 
the possibility that the benefits of earnings forecast accuracy are diminished when sell-side 
analysts use unsophisticated valuation heuristics to set their price targets.  
Asquith et al. (2005), for example, canvass the equity valuation methods mentioned in research 
reports authored by “All American” analysts and find that only about 13% of the reports refer to 
discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation as a basis for generating price targets. Instead, the reports 
routinely mention valuation heuristics (e.g., price-to-earnings ratio) that in theory yield less 
accurate price targets than do more rigorous multi period DCF valuation approaches.  
Asquith et al. (2005) find that price targets are disclosed in about 73% of the equity research 
reports authored by Institutional Investor “All American” analyst team members from 1997 to 
1999. By comparison, all of the reports contain a summary buy/sell recommendation and nearly 
all reports also provide earnings per share (EPS) forecasts—99% for the current fiscal year and 
95% for at least one subsequent year9. Price targets are most often associated with a 12-month 
horizon and are on average 33% higher than the stock’s market price at the time the report is 
issued. Price targets below current market price are uncommon, and the tendency to disclose a 
price target is greater for more favorable recommendations. This pattern of price target 
disclosure is also evident in random samples of sell-side analyst reports (Bradshaw 2002). 
Bradshaw (2002, 2004) focuses on what analysts do—rather than what they say they do—and 
infers valuation model use from analysts’ price targets and consensus stock recommendations. 
He too concludes that analysts rely on simple heuristics rather than formal valuation models, and 
thus use their earnings forecasts in relatively unsophisticated ways. However, Bradshaw’s (2002, 
2004) findings do not control for differences in earnings forecast accuracy as an input to the 
valuation process, and the price target sample in Bradshaw (2002) is quite small (n=67). Using a 
broad sample of 45,693 price targets provided to First Call by sell-side analysts during the 
calendar years 1997 through 2003, Gleason C. at10 find that two factors influence the profitability 
                                                 
9 Only 23% of the reports contain explicit EPS forecasts beyond one subsequent year, although EPS growth rate forecasts over a 
three to five year horizon are common. 
10 Cristi A. Gleason, W. Bruce Johnson, and Haidan Li, “The Earnings Forecast Accuracy, Valuation Model Use, and Price 
Target Performance of Sell-Side Equity Analysts”, July 2007. 
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of analysts’ price targets: concurrent earnings forecast accuracy and inferred use of a DCF 
valuation approach. 
Most sell-side analysts today respond to this dictum by disclosing price targets in their equity 
research reports. The direction of causality between price targets and stock recommendations is 
open to debate. 
Textbook descriptions of the equity research process characterize analysts’ buy/sell 
recommendations as the qualitative labels assigned to the quantitative comparison of price target 
and market price. A Buy or Strong Buy thus indicates a stock where the price target exceeds 
market price, a Hold indicates a stock where price target and market price are approximately 
equal to one another, and a Sell indicates a stock where the price target is below market price. 
Asquith et al. (2005, p. 276) offer a different point of view: “Analysts might be more likely to 
issue highly favorable recommendations due to concerns over personal compensation, 
relationships with the analyzed firms’ management, or their own firm’s underwriting business. 
Price targets can be either a way for analysts to ameliorate the effects of overly optimistic reports 
or a part of the sales hype used to peddle stocks.” Bradshaw (2002) echoes this latter theme, 
asserting that analysts sometimes concoct price targets ex post to justify their buy/sell 
recommendations. 
Irrespective of why they are disclosed by analysts, there is ample evidence indicating that 
investors consider price targets to be valuable information. Brav and Lehavy (2003) report that 
mean five-day abnormal returns around the release of revised price targets vary from -3.9% to 
+3.2%, depending on whether the report is a negative or positive price target revision. These 
abnormal returns are comparable to those occurring in response to changes in analysts’ buy/sell 
recommendations. For example, Asquith et al. (2005) find that release of a revised buy/sell 
recommendation by “All American” analysts is associated with a mean five-day abnormal return 
of -6.6% for downgrades and +4.5% for upgrades. Both studies confirm that changes in 
summary earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and price targets all provide independent 
value-relevant information to the capital market. 
But what valuation methodologies do sell-side analysts use when formulating prices target? Two 
strands of prior research are pertinent. One strand provides evidence on self-reported valuation 
model use based on content analysis of analysts’ reports. Demirakos et al. (2004) examine about 
100 reports on 26 companies listed on London Stock Exchange, issued between 1997 and 2001. 
Rigorous DCF valuation models (including variations of DCF like residual income) are 
mentioned in 50% of the reports. By contrast, theoretically inferior single-period comparative 
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valuation techniques (earnings or sales multiples, P/BV ratios, P/Assets ratios) dominate the 
sample: this means that analysts overwhelmingly refer to simple P/E multiples to support their 
target prices. This is consistent with the results obtained by Bradshaw (2002) and Block (1999). 
In fact, the first author finds that analysts do not refer to present value techniques as a method 
they rely on to support their recommendations: analyzing research reports of sell-side analysts, 
he finds that only 23% of the report contain earnings forecasts with horizons beyond the next 
fiscal year. Furthermore, Block, in a survey of 880 members of the AIMR (Association for 
Investment Management and Research) finds that nearly a half of the respondents never used 
present value techniques, while only 15% said they always used present value techniques. 
Despite these surprising results, we feel like evidence on valuation model use extracted from 
content analysis of sell-side reports may provide an incomplete picture of how analyst actually 
formulate price targets: we believe that individual analysts who use DCF methods may choose to 
communicate the results of their analyses in the simplest terms (bear in mind, also that research 
reports are usually very brief) , excluding a detailed discussion of present value techniques with 
all the hypotheses that this method implies (discount rates, growth rates, dividends, etc). 
Anyway, if analysts’ valuation judgements do not conform to finance theory, what models do 
analysts use to convert their forecasts into value judgements?  Again, Bradshaw (2002) examines 
approximately 100 analysts research reports on U.S. firms dated in 1998 and 1999, and compares 
the price targets disclosed with pseudo-price target constructed from PEG ratio11 and industry-
adjusted P/E multiples that incorporate analysts’ one-year and two-year-ahead earning forecasts. 
PEG-based pseudo- price targets are more highly correlated with the price targets disclosed than are 
pseudo-price targets constructed from industry P/E multiples (ρ>0,50 against ρ<0,33)12. He 
concludes that PEG ratio is an important heuristic used by analysts to convert their earnings 
forecasts into target prices and recommendations. 
The messages in these findings relevant to our study are the following: first, individual analysts 
often mention more than one valuation approach in describing how they arrive at their price 
                                                 
11 Price/Earnings To Growth, is a valuation metric for determining the relative trade-off between the price of a stock, the 
earnings generated per share (EPS), and the company's expected future growth A higher ratio is "worse" (expensive). This means 
that the price appears to be much too high relative to the estimated future growth in earnings. PEG is a widely employed 
indicator of a stock's possible true value, but despite its wide use, and has no accepted underlying mathematical basis; the PEG 
ratio's validity at extremes in particular (when used, for example, with low-growth companies) is highly questionable. It is 
generally only applied to so-called growth companies (those growing earnings significantly faster than the market). 
 
12 Pseudo-price targets based on theoretically more appropriate DCF model are not examined in Bradshaw (2002). 
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targets; second, the analysts often employ heuristics that arguably yield less accurate price targets 
than do, for instance, residual income-based multi-period DCF valuation approaches. 
 
 
 
2.3 Does valuation method choice affect target price accuracy? 
 
The three major verifiable predictions of sell-side analysts’ equity research reports are their 
earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target prices. While many studies investigate 
analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, academic interest has only recently 
turned to target prices13. Since the target audience of sell-side analysts’ equity research is 
investment fund managers, analysts must be careful when choosing a valuation methodology to 
justify their target prices. Fund managers are powerful players in the investment community, and 
analysts need to cultivate a positive reputation with professional fund managers to advance their 
careers.  
Regarding valuation model choice, financial statement analysis textbooks point to the advantages 
of multi-period valuation over single-period valuation techniques (Koller et al. 2005, Lundholm 
and Sloan 2003, and Penman 2003). The main argument is that multi-period valuation models 
better capture long-term value. In contrast, the main message to emerge from the literature on 
valuation method choice in practice is that single-period earnings multiples are the preferred 
valuation approach of sell-side analysts (Barker 1999, Block 1999, Bradshaw 2002, Demirakos, 
Strong, and Walker 2004, and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2005). To explain the popularity of 
earnings multiples over DCF, some researchers stress the difficulty of making multi-period 
forecasts in an uncertain corporate environment and estimating the appropriate discount rate for 
the DCF model (Block 1999). Other research shows that analysts tailor their valuation 
methodologies to firms with different profiles, preferring multi-period models to value 
companies with volatile earnings streams and unstable growth (Demirakos et al. 2004). More 
recently, Glaum and Friedrich (2006) examine the valuation preferences of European 
telecommunication analysts and find that the popularity of the DCF model has increased 
significantly since the end of the 1990s, when valuations were primarily driven by earnings 
multiples.  
                                                 
13 For a comprehensive literature review see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2006).  
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M.Walker et al (2007) contribute significant new empirical evidence relevant to the areas of 
valuation method choice, the empirical assessment of alterative valuation models, and the 
properties of target prices. Their study complements the above literature by providing further 
evidence that analysts make intelligent valuation method choices. Consistent with the predictions 
of valuation theory, analysts prefer the DCF model over earnings multiples when they face more 
challenging valuation cases. The empirical results show that analysts use DCF more frequently 
than earnings multiples to value small firms, high-risk firms, loss-making firms, and firms with a 
limited number of industry peers.  
With respect to the empirical assessment of alternative valuation models, previous studies 
exploring the prediction errors of equity valuation models use either ex-ante analyst earnings 
forecasts (Francis, Olsson, and Oswald 2000) or ex-post financial statement data (Penman and 
Sougiannis 1998) for the practical implementation of the models. More recently, Asquith et al. 
(2005) use 818 analyst reports over the period 1997–1999 to investigate whether there is a 
significant relationship between the valuation methodology used to generate the target price and 
target price accuracy. They find no significant relationship. However, analysts select which 
valuation methodology to use for each firm they follow. Comparing the target price accuracy of 
alternative valuation models unconditionally may produce misleading results if analysts tailor 
their valuation methodology to the circumstances of the firm, or if analysts who use a particular 
valuation method self-select companies for which they feel they have a comparative advantage.  
Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2006) use a large database of analyst earnings and target price 
forecasts over the period 1997–2003. As part of their study, they follow Bradshaw (2004), 
inputting analyst earnings forecasts to price-to-earnings-growth (PEG) and residual income 
valuation (RIV) models to generate pseudo-target prices. They find little evidence that the pseudo-
target prices generated by the RIV model using accurate earnings forecasts are associated with 
more accurate target prices.  
Their study extends and complements Asquith et al. (2005) and differs from Penman and 
Sougiannis (1998), Francis et al. (2000), and Gleason et al. (2006). They compare the accuracy of 
earnings multiples and DCF models using four alternative definitions of performance, using a 
large sample of comprehensive equity research reports that explicitly show the valuation model 
used to derive the target price. They condition the results on a set of firm, report, and industry 
specific factors that determine the level of difficulty of the valuation task. The empirical results 
show that the target price accuracy of the DCF model improves after including control variables 
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in the various model specifications, suggesting that analysts choose DCF in more demanding 
valuation cases.  
Finally their work is related to the empirical literature that investigates the properties of target 
prices. Brav and Lehavy (2003) use a large database of target prices over the period 1997–1999 
and document significant abnormal returns around target price revisions both unconditionally 
and conditional on contemporaneous stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. 
Employing a cointegration analysis to capture the long-term relation between these two 
measures, they estimate that the long-term mean target-price-to-current-price ratio is 1.28, i.e. 
target prices are 28% higher than current stock prices. They claim that their study serves as a 
starting point for further research on various related questions, including the valuation models 
used to determine target prices.  
Asquith et al. (2005) provide evidence that changes in target prices incorporate important 
information, especially in cases of downgrade or reiteration recommendations. Target price 
revisions impound new information beyond earnings forecast revisions and stock 
recommendations, and the market reaction to a target price change is stronger than to an equal 
percentage change in earnings forecast. Bradshaw and Brown (2006) use a large-scale sample of 
analyst target price forecasts for the period 1997–2002 drawn from the First Call database. They 
show that analysts do not exhibit differential ability in setting target prices and the market does 
not react differently to analysts with bad or good track records. They stress the importance of 
the difference between target price and current stock price as a determinant of target price 
accuracy. They argue that since there are no formal rankings of analysts based on target prices, 
analysts can show their optimism by issuing higher target prices14 . 
Walker’s study complements the above studies by reporting updated evidence on the relation 
between target prices and current stock prices. Previous empirical studies base their analysis on 
data from periods when stock market indices reached unprecedentedly high levels15. The 
practices of sell-side analysts and the quality of their research during these periods have been 
heavily criticized, and the industry has been undergoing a structural change since 200116.  
                                                 
14 Bonini, Zanneti, and Biachini (2006) reach a similar conclusion analyzing equity research reports for Italian listed firms 
published during 2000–2003. 
15 Bradshaw and Brown (2006) analyze the accuracy of target prices for the period 1997–2002, while Asquith et al. (2005) focus 
on the period 1997–1999. 
16 The old research model is dead. That may be the only certainty right now.” (Nocera 2004).  
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Compared to the studies of Asquith et al. (2005) and Bradshaw and Brown (2006) their sample 
contains a higher number of reports with neutral/negative recommendations and reports with 
more conservative target price forecasts. These differences might either be due to institutional 
differences between the City of London and Wall Street (Breton and Taffler 2001) or reflect 
overall changes in the practices of sell-side analysts. The study partially captures any effects of 
these underlying changes on the quality of analysts’ research output. They also provide additional 
empirical evidence on the determinants of target price accuracy, using a sample of 490 equity 
research reports published over the period July 2002–June 2004 to examine the accuracy of 
target prices based on earnings multiples and DCF models.  
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2.4 The content of Italian equity reports 
 
G. Bertinetti, E.Cavezzali, U.Rigoni [2006], present an empirical study on the content of reports 
on Italian stocks. They look at the way a report is made, assuming that this is the best way to 
better understand the background logic, the foundations from which the report emanates, 
mainly recommendations and target prices, (specifically, evaluation methods). To date there are 
few studies adopting a similar focus: for example, Barker [1999], and the prior research he 
reviewed, or Block [1999], look at the valuation models used by professional investors or 
financial analysts, but they adopt an interview based- research.  
There only few studies examining the valuation methods that analysts adopt in practice and 
using the content analysis of financial analysts’ reports (see, Asquith, Mikhail, Au [2005] and 
Demirakos, Strong, Walker [2004]). Asquith, Mikhail, Au [2005], for example, examine the 
market reaction to all reports’ elements (earnings forecasts, target prices, recommendations, 
justifications given). They find that the market reacts, also if the reports occur 
contemporaneously with other information release. When the report is a downgrade, the market 
places a grater reliance to its content than in the upgrade case. The analysts’ justifications are 
important and they reduce or eliminate the significance of earnings forecasts’ or 
recommendations’ revisions information. However, the market doesn’t react differently 
depending on evaluation methodology used by analyst. The authors also find that evaluation 
methods aren’t correlated also with the probability to achieve the target prices.  
The authors collected 4,603 reports regarding 29 blue chips listed in Italian stock market and 
released during years 2000 –2003 by important brokers and investment firms. They carefully 
examined each report to find out the evaluation method used to get the final recommendation.  
Reports have been basically classified looking at: 
a) the evaluation methods used (for example, market ratios, discounted cash flow and so on); 
b) the parameters used (forecasts and evaluations, discount rates, market risk premium, etc.); 
c) the final output thesis (basically recommendations and target prices). 
The conceptual framework considers two groups of evaluation methods: 
a) Fundamental methods: net asset methods (algebraic sum of assets’ and liabilities’ market 
values), financial methods, income methods, blended (composed) methods; 
b) Market ratios. 
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This classification depends on the “working logic” of the method. Different from fundamental 
analysis, in fact, market ratios require an active market making fair prices (market is always right). 
On the contrary, a fundamental evaluation could be done without a market17 benchmarking. 
In practice, fundamental analysis is defined as a five-step process (Penman, [2001]): 
1. Knowing the business (strategic analysis). 
2. Analyzing the information (accounting and non accounting information). 
3. Specifying, measuring and forecasting the value relevant payoffs. 
4. Converting the forecast to a valuation. 
5. Trading on the evaluation. 
Given these issues, they wonder whether a link between the evaluation method and the final 
output thesis exists. If a relation exists, this will be of great interest because it would show that 
the investment recommendations or the target prices are linked to specific criteria used for the 
analysis. 
Even if there is only a partial relation or no relation at all, nevertheless, it would be an interesting 
result. There could be several explanations for the latter result. 
On one side, for example, one could argue that the missing relation means that every method 
employed by the analyst, being rational, should get the same result, expressed by the 
recommendation or by the target price. 
On the other side one could think that the evaluation methods should be regarded as a “tool” 
for achieving a predetermined result. Bradshaw [2002], for example, finds that valuations based 
on price earnings ratios and expected growth are more likely to be used to support favourable 
recommendations, while qualitative analysis of a firm is more likely associated to less favourable 
recommendations. In other words, on the basis of this last hypothesis, the analyst evaluates the 
firm regardless of the best criteria to be used and only afterwards, ex post, he selects the method 
which better sustains and adheres to the expected result. 
The first puzzling finding is that for most of reports (3.252, about 70%) it is not possible to 
understand clearly the evaluation method used. This behaviour is coherent only with a very 
strong reputation effect, so that it does not matter why an analyst says something but only what 
he says and who he is. Then they restricted the analysis to reports whose main evaluation 
method was elicited. They divided evaluation methods into two main categories: the one based 
                                                 
17 Actually the discount rate and the market risk premium, basic fundamental methods elements, require an active market 
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on market ratios and the one on fundamental analysis that is the in-depth estimation of future 
profits and cash flows. The two methods occur with a quite similar proportion, but the year by 
year approach shows that the situation has changed through time. While in year 2000 market 
ratios were above fundamental analysis, in the following three years the weight of market ratios 
has constantly declined and in year 2003 the position was reversed. Looking at the 1,351 
remaining reports, the preferred evaluation method is based on fundamental analysis one, even if 
market ratios are very frequently used as “main” method. 
 
Table 2.2: Fundamental analysis vs. market ratios 
Evaluation method  Frequency   Percent  
 Fundamental analysis  763  56,48%  
 Market ratios  588  43,52%  
Total 1351 100%  
 
The most used among the fundamental analysis methods are the financial ones (34.05%), 
followed by the net asset methods (15.10%), the income methods (3.70%) and the composed 
methods (3.63%).In order to understand the driver which lets the analysts choose the “main “ 
method, it is possible to provide a more accurate and analytical investigation, following three 
different approaches: 
a) an industry approach, thinking that the dominance of a given industry may affect the choice 
of the method;  
b) a yearly approach, thinking that the existing environmental situation, such as booming or 
recession conditions, may affect the choice of the method. 
 
Table 2.3: Fundamental analysis vs. market ratios by sector 
 
 Fundamental analysis   111   68.52%   187   49.34%   174   41,53%   291   74,42%  
 Market ratios   51   31.48%   192   50.66%   245   58,47%   100   25,58%  
 TOTAL   162   100.00%   379   100.00%   419   100.00%   391   100.00%  
 INSURANCE   BANKING   MANUFACTURE   UTILITIES  
 
 
For insurance and utilities, the use of the fundamental methods is dominant, while for banking 
and for manufacture, the market ratio methods are more frequent than the fundamental ones. 
Insurance and utility stocks are often considered as “nearly bond” because the future cash flows 
that such companies will generate are usually positive and easier to be predicted, and the payout 
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ratio is high and constant. So the financial methods, close to those usually used for bond 
valuation, are more widespread. 
Banking and especially manufacture stocks refer to more dynamic companies, working in a 
much more competitive environment, exposed to a higher technological risk. So it is much more 
difficult for an analyst to forecast the future cash flows, profits and dividends he needs, in order 
to apply a method belonging to fundamental analysis. It is much easier for him to let the market 
do the job instead of him, using the growth rate of future cash flows, profits ad dividends 
implied in the market ratios. 
 
Graph 2.1: Fundamental analysis vs. market ratios by year 
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The yearly approach shows that the situation has changed through time. Graph 2.1 clearly shows 
that in year 2000 analysts used the market ratio methods more often than the fundamental 
analysis ones. Then, in the following three years the weight of the market ratio methods has 
constantly declined while the weight of the fundamental analysis methods has increased. In any 
case, the use of the market ratio methods as the “main” method is still relevant. 
The evolution mentioned above is coherent with the dynamic of the market prices. As the 
market price bubble exploded it became evident that the market was not efficient; as a 
consequence it became also evident that the market can’t do a better job than analysts. Further 
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investigations corroborate such a hypothesis. A cross section analysis between “industry and 
year” shows that: 
? in 2000, utilities is the only industry with a higher weight of analyst reports based on a 
fundamental analysis method respect to the weight of analyst reports based on the market ratio 
method; 
? in 2001, only banking and manufacture have a higher weight of analyst reports based on 
the market ratio method respect to the weight of analyst reports based on a fundamental analysis 
method, but the two are closer than in 2000; 
? in 2003, in every industry the weight of the analyst reports based on a fundamental 
analysis method is higher than the weight of the analyst reports based on the market ratio 
method. 
 
The study on the Italian market also assesses whether the evaluation methods have some impact 
on the estimates, measured by recommendation’s delta ((Target price – Current price ) / Currentprice). 
Surprisingly, they did not find any significant relation: it doesn’t matter if the report is based 
mainly on supposed original estimates, which is the typical feature of fundamental analysis, or on 
well known market data. The quality and the value of a report, if there are any, don’t rely on the 
evaluation method used. This result is consistent with the widespread habit of not eliciting 
evaluation methods. So why the analysts should give emphasis to what is not seems to be so 
important for the market? 
 
 
2.5 Price Target Performance of Sell-Side Equity Analysts 
 
Financial analysts play a key role in the process of producing and releasing economic and 
financial disclosure. These professionals “filter” the information released by the firms and insert 
it in their own evaluation process. In particular, the elaboration and the diffusion of the 
information represent the output of the specific activity of an analyst that is the production of 
the reports.  
Due to the key role of the financial analysts, their behaviour should be transparent and correct as 
much as possible, even if to date this objective has only been partially achieved. There is an 
abundant literature concerning analysts, their behaviour and their recommendations, but as far as 
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we know there are few studies focusing on an in-depth assessment of the whole content of their 
reports. 
Traditionally, a large part of literature has mainly focused on the role of the financial analysts, 
defined as “information brokers”. It has studied the impact on the capital market of the 
disclosure of the analysts’ reports information. Which type of specific information do we refer 
to? Reviewing the literature, mainly to the forecasts on earnings and/or their updating, to 
investment recommendations and to the target prices suggested by the financial analysts. 
It has been documented that historically the financial analysts forecasts have to be considered 
“price informative”: for example, Givoly e Lakonishok [1980] or Griffin [1976] have 
documented relevant abnormal returns at the same time as earning forecast revisions were 
released. So more recent studies have mainly focused on the analysis of a possible link between 
the forecast revisions and the short term abnormal returns. Lys e Sohn [1990], as an example, 
demonstrate that the forecasts of each analyst are price informative, despite the fact they are 
preceded by other types of disclosures, including the forecast revisions of different analysts.  
Stickel [1992] highlights that analyst members of II-All American team have compiled more 
accurate forecasts producing a more relevant impact on short term pricing. Gleason and Lee 
[2000] analyze not only the immediate impact of the forecast changes on prices, but extend the 
time frame of the monitoring up to two years after the time of the revision and detect a 
persistent price drift in each of the two monitored years. 
Furthermore, investors’ reactions to the forecast revisions seem to be related to factors 
dependent on either the analysts or their own forecasts, such as: forecast accuracy [Abarbanell et 
al. [1995], forecast timeliness, analysts experience, broker size and analysts coverage (Mikhail et 
al.[1997], Clement [1999], Jacob et al [1999] o Clement e Tse [2003]). Gleason and Lee [2003] 
demonstrate for example that the analyst’s reputation influences the speed of the price 
adjustments to the new forecasts. The market reaction is always immediate to forecasts issued by 
“famous” analysts of the “Institutional Investor All-Star” or those of the “ Wall Street Journal 
Earnings Estimators”. Moreover, the price reaction of the firms covered by a low number of 
analysts is weaker when compared to firms covered by a higher number of analysts. 
Athanassakos e Kalimipalli [2004], instead, examine the relation between the dispersion of 
earning forecast and the future volatility of the stock return, once documented the existence of a 
positive relation between these two factors. More precisely, as opposed to other studies mainly 
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focused on specific events (earnings release, for example), Athanassakos and Kalimipalli assume 
that there is a continuous flow of information resulting in a constant influence on market pricing 
from analysts’ monthly forecasts. 
According to Francis and Soffer [1997], investors reactions to earnings forecast changes also 
depend on the recommendations released by the analysts on the related stock. From a jointed 
analysis of the forecast/recommendation changes and the market response, measured as a higher 
return between the previous and the following day of the release, the authors prove their 
hypothesis. 
Jurgens [2000] focuses his own analysis only on the value of the stock recommendations and 
finds they have some impact on the intra-day stock returns (within 15 minutes from the 
recommendations release) and the daily ones (3 days returns are calculated), taking into account 
the contemporary release of other public news, if any. Registering also a reduction of intraday 
returns volatility, the author states that the analysts information is by far more effective 
compared to public news. 
Frankel, Kothari and Weber [2002] argue that financial analysts’ reports are “price informative”. 
More precisely, the information contents of the reports, (measured as the average of prices 
reaction to analysts forecast revisions and dependent, according to the model used, on the 
demand and supply of the information and on the number of analysts following a specific firm) 
increases with the increase in volatility volumes and returns. Reports appear to be more effective 
when there is bad news rather than good news. The investors reaction seems to be neither in 
excess nor limited. The short term reaction, in fact, is subsequently not inverted. 
Womack [1996] is particularly focused on the investment recommendations. Examining 
observing the time immediately before and after the recommendations changes, extra returns are 
registered after the recommendations. Based on these results, it is demonstrated that the 
recommendations and revisions have a great influence on the stock prices, both at the time of 
the revision and after. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman [2001] take a step forward and 
measure the returns arising from the strategies built on the basis of analysts’ recommendations. 
Belcredi, Bozzi and Rigamonti [2003] focus instead on the Italian market and measure the short 
term impact on the market (15 days) caused by changes of the analysts recommendations taken 
directly from the reports published on the Borsa Italiana S.p.A. website. The impact is measured 
through the calculation of the cumulative excess returns. 
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While the studies mentioned above evaluate the investors reaction to the analysts 
recommendations and forecasts, the Brav and Lehavy [2003] study observes the short term 
reaction and the long term trends of target prices and the related stock prices, jointly monitored. 
The authors observe that the target prices are informative both when considered alone and 
when linked to the forecasts and the recommendations, as substantial and abnormal returns 
occur immediately after the target revisions. 
Nevertheless, many studies highlight and detect, at the same time, some biased behaviours of the 
financial analysts. The researchers often discuss and analyze some typical anomalies, i.e.: 
a) too many favourable recommendations (for example buy or strong buy), compared to those 
unfavourable (sell or strong sell, for example); 
b) a too high optimism in the published analyses; 
c) evaluations systematically inefficient or biased. 
There can be many possible reasons for this evidence. A first stream of researchers states that 
anomalies in the financial analyst’s behaviour occur because of the conflicts of interest while a 
second stream tries to give a reasonable explanation of such events, referring to human 
psychology. 
The Michaely and Womack [1999] study can be classified as belonging to the “first research 
stream”. The authors, among the other issues analyzed, observe that at the time of an IPO, the 
underwriter company analysts (even though better informed) do not issue reports more accurate 
than the others. Instead, the underwriter company analysts are characterized by an excessive and 
unjustified optimism, probably related to the problems of conflict of interests. Furthermore, 
according to the Darrough and Russel [2002] results, bottom up analysts (those dedicated to one 
single firm), have some interest in maintaining good relationships with the management and are 
more inclined not to release bad news about the future growth of the firm. Richardson, Teoh 
and Wysocki [1999], instead, think anywhere that there is a sort of cooperation between analysts 
and firms in the so called “earnings game”, with the aim of manipulating investor perception. 
In regard to the second stream of research, (the one aiming to justify the financial analysts 
behaviour anomalies with psychology theories), it is worth mentioning the works by De Bondt 
and Thaler [1990], Abarbanell and Bernard [1992] and by Amir and Gonzac [1998]. While De 
Bondt and Thaler point out a systematic overreaction of the financial analysts, explained, 
according to the authors, through the irrational mechanisms driving all the people, Abarbanell 
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and Bernard, on the contrary, point out a systematic under-reaction to the earnings 
announcements. Finally, in the Amir and Gonzach study, both under-reaction and overreaction 
are observed, including optimism. Both anomalous behaviours depend on the irrational 
mechanisms driving the person. In the study, three heuristics influencing the evaluation 
processes used by the financial analysts are examined: the representativeness, associated to 
overreaction, the anchoring and adjustment, associated to underreaction and the leniency, 
generating optimism. 
Surveys are usually based on the final content of the reports (recommendations and target 
prices) or on the forecasts of different aggregations (for example, the earnings), extracted for 
example from I/B/E/S or First Call or even from the financial analysts’ reports themselves (see 
Belcredi, Bozzi Rigamonti’s study [2003]), but they seldom look at the ground where these 
“synthesis results” come from (see, for example Barker [1999], Block [1999] or Rogers, Rodney, 
Grant [1997]). 
 
 
2.6 The predictive power of target prices 
 
Over the past two decades, the predictive power of analysts has been the subject of many 
empirical studies.  Different authors have developed two main lines of research: the effects of 
stock recommendations on stock prices and the creation of portfolio strategies based on 
analysts’ recommendations. 
Early investigations on this topic have been primarily related to the market’s reaction to 
revisions in either analysts’ earning forecasts, or recommendations.  Abdel-Khalik  and Ajiinkya  
(1982)  find  significant  abnormal  returns  during  the  publication week  of  forecast revisions 
by Merrill Lynch analysts. Llyod-Davies and Canes (1978) indirectly examine the market reaction 
to security analyst recommendations by studying stock suggestions in “Wall Street Journal”. 
They present evidence on the effects of secondary dissemination of stock analysts' 
recommendations after primary dissemination to analysts' clients. The evidence suggests that 
such secondary dissemination significantly affects stock prices and that the effect is not reversed 
within the subsequent 20 trading days. One inference is that stock analysts provide economically 
valuable information to clients, and a second is that primary dissemination of such information 
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does not always bring about a full stock-price adjustment, contrary to the claims of the strong 
form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) and Stickel (1995) examine the sign of abnormal  returns.  
More  recently,  Womack  (1996)  uses  First  Call  data  to  examine  price changes. He shows  
that  the stocks subject  to a  recommendation change  record an abnormal return  significantly  
different  from  zero:  positive  changes  (+2.4%)  in  case  of  an  upgrade, negative  changes  (-
9.1%)  in  case  of  a  downgrade. The empirical results clearly  show  that stock prices and 
volumes are  influenced by  recommendation changes. Moreover,  the author highlights  that  
analysts  are  particularly  good  at  stock  picking  but  also  at  market  timing.   
 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), evaluate by a number of techniques the 
recommendations of a Canadian brokerage house regarding both Canadian and US stocks. The 
results reveal that an investor following the recommendations would have achieved significantly 
positive abnormal returns, even after allowing for transactions cost. 
Liu, Smith and Syed (1990) examine the impact of the “Heard on the street” (HOTS) column of 
The Wall Street Journal on common stock prices. The result of the study indicates that the HOTS 
column appears to have an impact on stock prices on the publication day; they also find a 
smaller, but statistically significant, impact on two days preceding the publication. Furthermore, 
they observe that the significant abnormal returns on these days are associated with higher 
trading volumes. Finally, they report that the reaction of stock prices is symmetrical with respect 
to the buy and sell recommendations. 
 
Womack (1996) performs an analysis of buy and sell recommendations of stocks issued by 
security analysts at major U.S. brokerage firms. He finds that initial reaction at the time of the 
recommendations is large, both in price and volume terms, even though few recommendations 
actually provide previously unavailable information. Furthermore, for buy recommendations, the 
mean post-event drift in the following month is modest (+2.4%), but for sell recommendations, 
the drift is larger (-9.1%) and extends for six months. The author highlights  that  analysts  are  
particularly  good  at  stock  picking and  market  timing. 
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Clement (1999) tries to explain why systematic and time persistent differences in analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy exist. His study finds that forecast accuracy is positively associated 
with analysts’ experience (a surrogate for analyst ability and skill) and employer size (a surrogate 
for resources available), and negatively associated with the number of firms and industries 
followed by the analyst (measures of task complexity). The results suggest that analysts’ 
characteristics may be useful in predicting differences in forecasting performance, and that 
market expectation studies may be improved by modelling these characteristics. 
 
Bradshaw (2000, 2002) focuses on the use of earning forecasts and target prices to justify 
analysts’ stock recommendations. In the first paper he investigates how analysts’ earning 
forecasts are related to their stock recommendations. He finds that recommendations are 
generally unrelated to the deviation of intrinsic value estimates from trading prices, while he 
finds heuristic valuations to be strongly related to analysts’ recommendations: analysts appear to 
value and recommend stocks based on heuristics such as the PEG ratio. In the second paper he 
documents the frequency with which analysts disclose target prices as justifications for their 
recommendations. He finds that analysts use target price justifications in over two-thirds of the 
sample reports, and higher target prices are associated with more favourable stock 
recommendations. Further evidence suggests that analysts actually compute target prices using 
price-multiples heuristics such as PEG. However, in reports that do not disclose target prices, 
estimates of target prices based on these multiples are unable to justify the stock 
recommendation. One explanation might be that analysts do not disclose target prices when 
such disclosure would not support the recommendation.  
 
Barber et al. (2001, 2003) analyse the value of trading strategies based on the consensus level of 
the stock recommendations issued by analysts in the United States. In their first paper, they 
observe  that  the  trading  strategy consisting of buying  the most  highly  recommended  stocks 
and  simultaneously  selling  the  least  favoured  stocks  generates  abnormal  returns,  which 
disappear  when  the  transaction  costs  are  taken  into  account.  In  their second  paper,  they 
observe that the same strategies give negative returns. The reason seems to be the inclusion of 
the turbulent 2000 period, where stock prices crashed. Analysts continued to give favourable 
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recommendations  to  small,  growth-oriented  companies,  precisely  those  companies  that 
performed worse  as  from  that  date.  
 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) examine the short-term market reaction to target price announcements 
and long-term co-movement of target and stock prices. Consistently with their predictions, they 
find that target prices are informative both unconditionally and conditional on a 
contemporaneously issued recommendation and earning forecasts revisions. Recommendations 
and earning forecasts revisions are, however, also informative in the presence of target prices. 
 
Belcredi, Bozzi and Rigamonti (2003) analyze the impact on Italian stock prices of changes in 
analyst recommendations, both on the report date (when reports are distributed to clients) and 
on the public access date (when they become publicly available). They consider more than 5,000 
research reports available on the Italian Stock Exchange website. They document an excess 
return of +2.52% for upgrades, -2.63% for downgrades, both statistically significant, over a 
three-day event window around the report date. Abnormal returns are already present prior to 
the event day. Post-event abnormal returns are seemingly differentiated according to the type of 
recommendation: upgrades show a significant +2.60% CAR over a 14 day-period, though daily 
abnormal returns are small and not significant; downgrades show no significant abnormal return. 
Abnormal returns around the public access date are small and not significant, indicating that the 
information conveyed by reports has already been incorporated into prices. The analysis of 
trading volumes substantially confirms the preceding results. Their data reveal that no reaction is 
induced by the publication of reports. Research reports seem to convey information to the 
market but such information is incorporated in stock prices around the event day that is when 
brokerage firms' customers - that pay for research - receive it. 
 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) critically evaluate the investment value of stock 
recommendations in light of other currently available information. They find that analysts prefer 
high momentum stocks and growth stocks, that analysts recommendations are positively 
correlated with momentum indicators, and that stocks which receive more favourable 
recommendations typically have more positive price momentum, higher trading volume 
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(turnover), higher past and projected growth, more positive accounting accruals, and more 
aggressive capital expenditures. 
 
Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) investigate the market reaction to the information released in 
security analyst reports. They show that the market reacts significantly and positively to changes 
in recommendation levels, earnings forecasts, and price targets. While changes in price targets 
and earnings forecasts both provide information to the market, revisions in price targets have a 
larger and more significant impact than comparable revisions in earnings forecasts. The text of 
the report is also a significant source of information as it provides the justifications supporting 
an analyst's summary opinion. The results further show that analysts correctly predict price 
targets slightly over 50% of the time. Finally, the valuation methodology used does not seem to 
be correlated with either the market's reaction or the analyst's accuracy. 
 
Bradshaw and Brown (2005) examine the overall and individual analyst accuracy of 12 months 
after target price forecasts. On average, 24-45% of analysts’ target prices are met, and analysts do 
not exhibit persistent differential abilities to forecast target price.  
 
They show that the market acts as if it understands analyst inability to consistently forecast target 
prices and discounts more optimistic target prices. On the contrary, analysts do exhibit persistent 
skills in forecasting earnings. They believe that this difference is due to the fact that earnings 
forecasts accuracy is subject to considerable scrutiny, and analyst compensation and job tenure 
are related to, inter alia, earnings forecasts accuracy. 
 
Bonini, Zanetti and Bianchini (2006, 2007) analyze  the  accuracy  of  target  prices  and the 
profitability of trading strategies based on equity reports. In the first paper they document 
prediction errors consistently different from zero (4% for sell recommendations, 46.81% and 
31.98% for strong buy and buy recommendations), auto-correlated, non-mean reverting and 
positive in sign, which suggest the existence of a systematic upward bias. 
They conclude that since target prices are supposed, as documented by previous studies, to have 
a positive and significant price effect, issuing overestimated target prices may be an attempt to 
affect stock prices. In the second paper they use target prices to build portfolio strategies. They 
 54
first exploit returns embedded in target prices as signals to open the positions on certain stocks, 
then they use raw or adjusted target prices as closing transactions signals. They build three 
different strategies: the first one uses the target prices without any corrections, while the other 
two correct target prices by the historical price reaction and by the historical target price error. 
The results show that every strategy obtains positive abnormal returns. 
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Chapter 3 
Do target prices predict rating changes? 
Empirical evidence 
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3.1 Previous studies 
 
Both bond rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and 
communicate their opinions to investors. But what is the relevance of rating agencies in today’s 
capital markets? Assessments by the popular press diverge widely.  
For some observers, rating agencies are notoriously slow and unreliable producers of 
information. They have a poor record of crisis forecasting, as evidenced by many prominent 
credit events like Enron or Worldcom18. In line with a weak forecasting record, most empirical 
studies on rating action and stock market return find rather limited effects of rating 
announcements on firm’s market value. More specifically, most studies find limited share price 
effect for downgrades and typically no effect for upgrades. For a different group of observers, 
rating agencies play a rather influential role in today’s markets. In particular, downgrade 
decisions are sometimes seen as “verdicts” that exert a deep influence on a firm’s refinancing 
cost. For this group of observers, therefore, rating agencies are perceived as being opaque, 
oligopolistic and powerful.  
A large stream of literature has verified the informational content of bond rating, through the 
impact of rating changes on bond and stock prices. The hypothesis underlying the studies is the 
following: if rating has an innovative informational content compared to the publicly available 
information, rating changes should have a consistent impact on market prices. Conversely, if the 
rating is based mostly on public information and if the necessary updates are not timely enough, 
agencies’ rating actions should not produce any effect on market prices. 
Recent studies report that equity markets react negatively (positively) to news that a company's 
debt is being downgraded (upgraded) by Moody's or Standard and Poor's, indicating that rating 
actions have informational content with negative (positive) implications on earning forecast and 
stock performance. 
The available empirical evidence is related mostly to the US. One of the first contributions was 
provided by Weinstein (1977), who collected a sample of bond rating revisions released by 
Moody’s in the period 1962-1964. He concentrates on the informational content of rating 
revisions by examining price changes in the interval before and after rating actions. He 
                                                 
18 These issuers have been downgraded by the major rating agencies only few days before their default. 
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concludes that rating revisions do not have any effect on the prices of the related bonds. These 
results would confirm market efficiency in the semi-strong form. 
The adaptive behavior of rating agencies and subsequently the absence of any reactions to rating 
changes has also been reported by some successive studies19. 
Hand et al. (1992) examine the daily excess bond and stock returns associated with rating 
agencies’ announcements.  Their sample is composed of 250 additions to S&P’s credit watch 
lists between 1981 and 1983, and 1,100 actual rating changes announced by Moody’s and S&P 
between 1977 and 1982. They distinguish between rating revisions preceded by rumors and press 
releases, and uncontaminated rating revisions. With regard to the sample of watch lists, the 
authors observe significant changes in stock prices only if there are possible downgrades, while 
bond yields seem to react significantly for both downgrades and upgrades; the reaction is higher 
in the uncontaminated sub-sample. With regard to the actual rating changes, only downward 
revisions seem to have an effect on both stocks and bonds; by contrast, upward revisions 
produce effects only on bond yields. 
 
Goh and Ederington (1993) find that revisions do have effects on both equity and debt. They 
examine the reaction of common stock returns to bond rating changes. While previous studies 
find a significant negative stock response to downgrades, indicating that these downgrades have 
informational content with negative implications, they argue that this reaction should not be 
expected for all downgrades. They argue that downgrades may have a different impact on stock 
prices depending on the reason which led to an increase in the firm’s risk and, in particular, on 
whether such an increase corresponds to a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. 
The authors actually find a significant negative market reaction only to downgrades due to a 
deterioration of a firm’s financial prospects (having negative implications for stockholders). They 
argue that it is unlikely that all downgrades are a surprise since many follow news of an increase 
in the firm's level of risk. Secondly, and more importantly, while a surprise downgrade is clearly 
bad news for bondholders it is not necessarily bad news for stockholders. In particular, if the 
bonds are downgraded because the rating agencies foresee an increase in leverage that will 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders, bond prices should fall but equity prices 
should rise. 
                                                 
19 See Pinches and Singleton (1978) and Wakeman (1978). 
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Based on the announced reasons given by the rating agencies, they separate the rating changes 
into groups based on whether they have positive or negative implications for equity holders and 
whether or not they seem to be in response to recently released public information. To verify 
this hypothesis, they split the sample of rating actions into three categories corresponding to 
different reasons: (1) changes of the company’s financial prospects; (2) changes in debt/equity 
ratio; (3) other reasons.20 They find that the market reacts negatively to downgrades that result 
from a revaluation of the firm's or industry's financial prospects while there is no significant 
reaction to rating changes for other reasons21. They find that downgrades associated with 
deteriorating financial prospects convey new negative information to the capital market, but that 
downgrades due to changes in firms' leverage do not. Looking at downward revisions, they show 
that downgrades are associated with negative revision of the firm’s prospective cash flows. Since 
equity has secondary claims compared to debt, the negative expectation of operating cash flows 
(and consequently of FCFE), will negatively affect bondholders but, to a larger extent, equity 
holders.  
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) check also for post-announcement drift by investigating the price 
impact along a three-year horizon. Downgrades and upgrades are broken up into two 
subsamples depending on whether they relate to holding or subsidiaries. Using essentially all 
Moody’s bond ratings changes between 1970 and 1997 they find negative abnormal returns on 
the magnitude of 10 to 14 percent in the first year following downgrades but no reliable 
abnormal returns following upgrades. The results show that only downgrades matter: they 
exhibit a post-announcement effect which lasts at least one year and is more pronounced for 
holdings, small firms and lower rated entities. 
A stream of the literature investigates the impact of rating changes specifically for banks. 
Schweitzer et al. (1992) test the null hypothesis that rating actions matter less for banks than for 
corporations, the idea being that since banks are highly regulated entities the amount of 
information available to the market might be higher and hence the information content of rating 
                                                 
20 The reason for this classification can be explained as follows:  since equity has secondary claims compared to debt, in the first 
case the expectation of decreasing operating cash flows will negatively affect bondholders but, to a larger extent, equity holders 
(so that both bond and stock prices should fall); in the second case, conversely, an increase in leverage will transfer wealth from 
bondholders to stockholders (so that bond prices should fall but stock prices would rise). 
21 However the announcements of downgrades due to an increase in leverage are usually related to information that the public 
already has (for example acquisitions financed with debt). 
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actions might be lower. The alternative hypothesis (i.e. rating actions matter more for banks) is 
based on the idea that regulators might allow the withholding of adverse information in view of 
the preservation of the stability of the banking system, therefore leading to more pronounced 
abnormal returns associated with unfavorable bank rating actions. In fact, the empirical evidence 
shows that downgrades lead to a stronger effect when involving banks, thus lending support to 
the second hypothesis. 
Gropp and Richards (2001) assess the impact of rating changes performed by S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch between 1989 and 2000 on stock and bond prices for a sample of 32 European banks. 
They find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, while for stock prices strong 
effects are associated only with unanticipated rating changes; moreover, the underlying reason 
seems to matter for the sub-sample of downgrades: the ones motivated by the worsening of the 
issuer’s financial prospects results in a reduction in the prices, while the increase of issuer’s 
leverage results in an increase in the prices. The analysis of abnormal returns in the two months 
before the announcements shows the absence of significant variations in the prices. The authors, 
however, conclude that rating revisions have an innovative informational content in terms of the 
news available to the public. 
Most of the studies presented above agree about the asymmetric reaction of market prices to 
negative and positive rating events: only after downward revisions is it possible to observe 
significant reactions.  
Vassalou and Xing (2003) explain this point as stemming from the pattern of the underlying 
default probability. Based on the same sample of Dichev and Piotroski, they calculate an 
indicator of default probability and they verify that the asymmetric reaction is due to asymmetric 
variations of that indicator. 
This index would move sharply only before downgrade announcements (by rising before and 
gradually decreasing in the following years), while it would follow a less pronounced pattern 
before upgrades. Moreover, the authors argue that the ranking of the firms resulting from rating 
can be easily replicated by using financial indicators such as size or book to market value: therefore, 
the information content of ratings would be poor. 
Linciano (2005) assesses the impact of rating changes on stock prices for a sample of 299 rating 
actions performed by the three agencies between 1991 and 2003 and involving Italian listed 
companies. Rating changes include both upgrades and downgrades, as well as positive and 
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negative credit watches. Abnormal returns for stock prices are estimated, controlling for the 
anticipations through watches, press speculations or corporate disclosure, the sector of the rated 
firm, the reason which prompted the rating action. 
Consistently with the previous empirical evidence, results show that weak negative abnormal 
returns are associated with downgrades in the event window [-1;+1]; as far as upgrades are 
concerned, significant positive abnormal returns arise after the rating change (in the window 
[+2;+20]), thus signaling a delay in the market reaction to positive news. 
Only rating changes preceded by watch lists or outlooks (1) show significant cumulated 
abnormal returns before the rating action (in the window [-20;-11]) and (2) show significant 
cumulated abnormal returns after the rating action (exception is made for the upgrades indicated 
above). This result is not consistent with the conclusions of the US research, which always 
shows a stronger reaction of market prices to events not preceded by watch lists or outlooks. 
Similarly, rating announcements related to information that has already been released 
(contaminated events) result in higher abnormal returns: this might provide evidence that the 
stock price reaction is mainly due to the contaminating information rather than to the rating 
action itself. 
The sector of the rated entity seems to matter only for downgrades; however, due to the 
different sizes of the sub-samples (the sub-sample of corporate issuers is smaller), this evidence 
can not be regarded as conclusive. 
The implications of the empirical evidence on the information content of ratings are not 
unambiguous. In any case, some elements indicate that rating may have an innovative 
informational content, even though sometimes the revisions may not be timely. Among the 
reasons for such a delay, there is the widespread habit of agencies not to worsen situations of 
temporary difficulties, thereby turning them into default. 
 
While most academic research has been focused on studying the impact of rating actions on 
bond prices, stock returns or earning forecasts, only a few papers instead investigate if and how 
it is possible to predict rating actions.  
Goh and Ederington (1998) explore what information rating changes and changes in analysts’ 
earnging forecasts provide and when, by examining changes in both actual earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts of future earnings around bond rating changes by Moody’s over the period 1984-1990. 
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While rating changes and revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts apparently bring some new 
information to the market, there is also evidence that both react to public information that the 
market already has. For instance, although studies of bond ratings have established that the stock 
market reacts negatively to bond downgrade announcement (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), 
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Wansley and Clauretie (1985), Cornell, Landsman and 
Shapito (1989, and Matolcsy and Lianto (1995)), it also has been observed that downgrades 
(upgrades) tend to occur following periods of negative (positive) abnormal returns.  
Comparing the timing of the release of rating actions and equity researches, their primary 
concern in their study was Granger causality, that is whether rating changes help predict earning 
forecasts and vice-versa.  Their evidence shows that most bond downgrades are preceded by 
declines in actual and forecasted earnings, indicating that downgrades are at least partially a 
response to public information that both earnings analysts and the market already have. 
Moreover, both actual earnings and forecasts of future earnings tend to fall following 
downgrades. Although part of this post-downgrade forecast revision can be attributed to 
negative news, regarding actual earnings, most appears to be a reaction to the downgrade itself. 
In contrast to downgrade, upgrades appear to be purely a response to information that the 
market already has since there is no market response, since the upgrades follow both periods of 
positive returns and upward earnings forecast revisions and since there is no evidence that actual 
earnings rise following upgrades. 
Di Cesare (2006) analyzes the ability of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads, bond spreads and 
stock prices to anticipate the decisions of the main rating agencies for the largest international 
banks. Conditional on negative rating events, all the indicators show significant abnormal 
changes before both announcements of review and actual rating changes, but rating actions still 
seem to convey new information to the market. Results for positive rating events are less clear-
cut with the market indicators showing abnormal behaviours only in conjunction with the 
events. Between the elected market indicators, the CDS spread is particularly useful to predict 
negative events and stock prices for positive events. 
Moreover, while most of academic research has been devoted to the relationship between bond 
rating actions and stock returns, bond prices and earning forecast, the relationship between 
target prices and rating actions has remained essentially unexplored.  
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Following this field of research, our study contribute to the existing literature by providing an 
evidence, not yet explored by previous studies, of any anticipation in target prices revision prior 
to a rating actions, in order to analyze the ability of equity analysts to predict the decisions of the 
main rating agencies.  
 
 
3.2 Hypotheses  
 
While rating agencies give opinions about the creditworthiness of the issuers,  equity  analysis  
provides  investors with  information  on  the  current  and  future prospects  of  the same  
companies.  
As presented above, most academic research and business press attention has been devoted to 
the relationship between rating actions and earning forecasts, or bond and stock returns, to the  
effect  of  analysts’  recommendations  on  stock returns or trading volumes, and to the accuracy 
of stock recommendations and target prices. But the ability of target  prices  to  predict  future  
rating actions  has,  surprisingly,  remained  essentially unexplored. 
Previous studies have found that rating actions can be largely predicted from publicly available 
information22. In particular, Goh and Ederington (1998) found that downgrades are partially a 
response to information that analysts already have and have impounded in earnings forecasts23. 
In contrast, upgrades appear to be a response to information that analysts already have since the 
upgrades follow periods of upward earnings forecasts24. In short, the authors have proven 
earnings forecasts to be meaningfully correlated with rating actions. 
We  believe  that  understanding  analysts’  target  price  forecasting power is relevant  at least for  
two  reasons.   
First, target price’s influence on stock market prices has been largely documented by several 
previous studies (Asquith et al. (2005), Barber  et  al. (2001), etc).  
                                                 
22 Holthausen and Leftwich, “The effect of bond rating agency announcement on bond and stock prices”, 1986. 
23 However, in the authors’ opinion, analysts apparently view the downgrades as also having negative implications for the 
current  year’s earnings since they respond by revising their forecasts sharply downward after the downgrade. 
24 Nonetheless, upgrades are followed by upward revisions in the analysts’ earnings forecast, although they are considerably 
smaller compared to the downward revisions following downgrades. 
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Secondly,  target  prices  are  a  straightforward measure  of  the potential change in the value of 
the underlying security which can be valuable to investors and  may  have  an  influence  on  
their  investment strategies.  Therefore,  understanding what the  influence  of  analysts is in  
predicting  future  rating actions  should  be valuable  information to investors. Since the 
determinants of target prices are largely unexplored,   leaving  room  for  providing  investors 
with additional  hints  on  such  price sensitive  information,  that  can  be  used  to  improve  
pricing  efficiency  and  investment arbitrage.  
The hypotheses to be tested are the following. 
 
Hypothesis 1: since 1) target prices are statements incorporating earnings forecasts, which have proven to be 
meaningfully correlated with rating actions25,2) target prices revisions are released much more frequently than 
rating actions 3) downgrades (upgrades) associated with negative (positive) revision of the firm’s prospective cash 
flows will negatively affect bondholders and, to a larger extent, equity holders who have secondary claims compared 
to debt - we expect that downgrades (upgrades) can be anticipated by a reduction (increase) in target prices and 
that, in the case of upgrades, the anticipation effect should be more evident. We thus expect that changes in target 
prices may anticipate rating changes. 
Hypothesis 1 refers to the monitoring period of three different windows before the date of each 
agency’s rating actions included in the sample. According to the literature, rating actions include 
upgrades and downgrades, as well as positive and negative outlooks, controlling for any 
anticipations through watch lists. 
 
Hypothesis 2: relative optimism in target prices across stock recommendations can be observed in the Italian 
context so we expect a bias towards upgrades.  
Analysts’ behaviour is clear in the light of their overly-optimistic behavior (their habit to 
overestimate (underestimate) increases (reductions) in the prices)26. We bring our readers’ 
attention to the fact that (1) companies voluntarily release favorable information but are 
reluctant to release unfavorable information, and (2) rating agencies are more interested in 
detecting deterioration of creditworthiness than improvements. These considerations, together 
                                                 
25 Goh and Ederington, “Bond rating agencies and stock analysts: who knows what when”, 1998. 
26 Mark T. Bradshaw, “The use of target prices to justify sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations”, 2001. 
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with the overly-optimistic behavior of sell-side analysts, could explain asymmetric behavior of 
target prices prior to upgrades or downgrades. 
 
Hypothesis 3: change in target prices better predict announced changes, by additions to the watch list, than 
unanticipated ones. Rating announcements related to information that has already been released through a watch 
list (contaminated events) is expected to result in higher changes in target prices since such a credit event is typically 
a public signal, which can be reflected in stock price27. 
 
In addition to outright changes in ratings, Hand et al. [1992] have stressed that it is also 
important to consider the information contained in the “credit watch list.” Companies are added 
to the credit watch list, if the rating agency believes that a rating change is likely. This 
information is supplemented by the expected direction of the change, e.g. there may be 
“indicated upgrades”, “indicated downgrades” or “developing.” The credit watch would indicate 
“developing,” if a ratings change of unknown direction is likely. In this paper, we follow Hand et 
al. [1992] and use credit watches in two ways. First, we examine changes in target prices around 
credit watches, testing whether they contain relevant market information. 
Second, we use them as a means of distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated ratings 
changes. As in Hand et al. [1992] we argue that a ratings change that is preceded by a ratings 
watch in the same direction should be largely anticipated and, hence, should be associated with 
significant changes in target prices. 
 
Hypothesis 4: different regulatory regimes (designed respectively for financial and non financial issuers), which 
imply different degrees of transparency, and the different evaluation methods adopted to evaluate financial and non 
financial firms, may influence target price behavior prior to a rating action. 
 
There are at least two U.S. studies, which investigate the question of whether ratings changes 
matter specifically for banks. As Schweitzer et al. [1992] argue, there are reasons to think that 
ratings changes might have a different impact on banks as highly regulated entities, as opposed 
to corporations. They note that the regulation of an industry may increase the amount of 
                                                 
27 Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992). These authors show that a watch list entry with 
designation downgrade is accompanied by a negative stock market reaction. 
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information available to the market. If so, the informational value of firm-specific events may be 
less for highly regulated firms. Indeed, Wansley and Dhillon [1989] and Plonchek et al. [1989] 
find that the announcement effect of new security issues is smaller for banks than for industrial 
firms, and Asquith and Mullins [1986] report similar findings for equity issues made by public 
utilities. On the other hand, Schweitzer et al. [1992] note that bank regulators may withhold 
adverse information in order to sustain investor confidence in a troubled bank and avoid bank 
runs and/or because the existence of a troubled bank may reflect badly upon the regulator’s 
performance. If so, we should observe no significant movement in target prices associated with 
unfavorable bank debt rating changes prior to the rating action itself. On the other hand, if any 
adverse information is available in the rating period, we should observe higher, more 
pronounced negative changes in target prices than those for industrial firms.  
Moreover, evaluation methods matter. According to previous studies28, market ratio methods are 
more frequently used to evaluate banks than the fundamental ones. It implies that it is much 
easier to assess and thus, to adjust, target prices for a financial firm, if such information is 
available to the market. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection and Data 
 
Our original database (Panel A) includes over 10,000 equity reports published from January 1st 
2000 up to December 31st 2005, reporting target prices. We start our analysis selecting 10,769 
reports published by 47 different analysts covering 98 companies listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange and representing approximately 81.96% of the overall market capitalization. 
 
Table 1 (Panel A) 
Descriptive statistic of companies  
 
 
Table 2 (Panel B) 
Summary statistics of reports by industry 
 
 
                                                 
28 G.Bertinetti, E.Cavezzali, U.Rigoni, “The content of reports on Italian stocks. Do evaluation methods matter?”, 2006. 
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Tables 1, 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics for the report issued on the companies included in 
the sample reports’. Companies  are  covered  on  average  by  110  reports,  but  data  on  
standard deviation and median  hint  at  some  skewness  in  distribution.  
The  relative  number  of reports  per  company  shows  that  the most-analysed  companies (i.e. 
Telecom Italia  tops  370  reports,  or  just 3,44%  on  the  total  sample) are  the  most  
capitalized  companies  in  the  sample.  This  evidence  indirectly provides  support  to  previous  
results  on  financial  analysts  focusing  their  attention  to stocks with higher market 
capitalization. 
Moreover, as previous studies suggest, analysts are more likely to cover firms that provide them 
with more and better quality information required for analysis. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample sorted by industry distribution. 
Data show that ‘Financials’ is the most represented industry with 29 companies  and  3,323  
reports;  Cyclical  industries  are  also  well  represented  both  in  terms  of companies and 
reports. Finally, Table 3 shows total recommendations’ distribution and yearly 
recommendations’ distribution. Interestingly the amount of research grows then reduces. This 
effect is largely due to two factors: the merger of TIM, the mobile arm of Telecom Italia, in the 
parent company and the increased amount of companies listed that has caused wider dispersion 
of research.  
 
Table 3 (Panel B) 
Reports annual distribution per recommendation class 
 
Bradshaw29 showed  that  the  informativeness  of  qualitative recommendation  is  different  
among  recommendation  class.  Intuitively, qualitative recommendations  and  target  prices  
should  provide  homogeneous  information  to investors, i.e. a Strong Buy should be associated 
with a high implicit return target price (adjusted  for  the  market  momentum).  In  Table  4  we  
follow  this  intuition  adopting recommendation  classes  as  proxies  of  different  levels  of  
implicit  profitability of analysts’ price targets  trying  to explore the existence of differential 
predictive ability. Fore each recommendation class, we  report  predicted  implicit  returns  
computed  as  the  ratio  between target  price (TP) and  the  market  price  at  the  issue  date.   
                                                 
29 See “The use of target prices to justify sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations”, 2001.  
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Table 4 (Panel B) 
Relative Optimism in Target Prices across Stock Recommendations 
 
The table shows the distribution of target prices (TP) for all the Italian Sample, issued between 
1st January 2000 - 31st December 2005, scaled by actual price (P) for the reports collected. Share 
trading price is obtained from Datastream, and reflects the closing share price on the trading day 
just preceding the date of the stock recommendation. Consistent with other studies30 and recent 
press reports, we find that analysts rarely issue sell or strong sell recommendations. Table 4 
shows that only 9% of the recommendations in our sample fall into these two categories. In 
contrast, 17% of the recommendations are classified as strong buy, 40% as buy and 34% as hold. 
According to Bradshaw, we tested the different disclosure levels of target prices across stock 
recommendations suggesting that, even in the Italian context, analysts are more inclined to 
provide them when their recommendations are more favorable (i.e., Buy or Strong Buy) than 
they are when their recommendations are less favorable (i.e., Hold). In order to assess the 
distribution of our set of variables, we perform the Shapiro-Wilk W test31 for normality. Test of 
differences are shown in the bottom section of the table and are one-sided tests for the 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) predicting that more favourable recommendations are justified by a 
higher ratio, TP/P. Test statistics and p-values under the Mean column reflect t-tests for 
differences in mean TP/P between adjacent recommendations categories. 
Differences in TP/P between Hold and Buy recommendations are statistically significant at 
conventional levels for both the mean and median (the latter estimated using the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann 
and Whitney 1947).  
Like the underlying stock recommendations, the target prices are quite optimistic with an overall 
mean (median) TP/P ratio of 1.15 (1.12). Thus, the analysts’ mean (median) target prices for 
these companies are 15 percent (12 percent) above current trading prices. The minimum average 
ratio of TP/P is 0.69 (Strong Sell), and the maximum is 1,34 (a Strong Buy). More interestingly, 
                                                 
30 Asquith et al (2005), Information content of equity analyst reports, report that approximately 71% of all recommendations are 
buys or strong buys, 28,5% are holds and only 0,05% are sells or strong sells. Similarly, Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2002) report 
that approximately 55% of all recommendations are buys or strong buys, 39% are holds and only 6% are sells or strong sells. See 
also Barber, Lehavy, Mc Nichols and Trueman (2001).    
31 Swilk can be used with 4<=n<=2,000 observations 
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there is a monotonic increase in TP/P across the recommendation categories. TP/P is larger for 
Strong Buy than for Buy recommendations, and TP/P is larger for Buy than for Hold 
recommendations. 
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 4 are thus aligned with those reported in Asquith et 
al. (2005), Bradshaw and Brown (2007) and Brav and Lehavy (2003). As many studies highlight 
and detect, we also find some biased behaviours of the financial analysts and, in particular, the 
following anomalies: 
a) too many favourable recommendations (for example buy or strong buy), compared to 
those unfavourable (sell or strong sell, for example); 
b) a too high optimism in the published analyses; 
 
This alignment suggests that, at the recommendation level, our sample doesn’t show critical 
differences with those of other markets indicating that our results can be generalized. 
We also provide evidence on the effect on TPt0/Pt0 of each recommendation class. We regress 
the implicit return (TPt0/Pt0) expressed by target price at the time of report publication on 4 
dummy variables representing  the  recommendation classes 'Strong Buy, 'Buy', 'Sell', 'Strong 
Sell'. The  test  regression  takes  the  following form:  
 
TPt,j,i/Pt,j = α+β1 Strong buy + β2Buy + β3Sell + β4Strong sell + ε 
 
where TPt,j,i/Pt,j represents the implicit return expressed by target price at the time of report 
publication the for each analyst i on company j, and  the  recommendation  variables  (Strong 
Buy;  Buy;  Sell;  Strong Sell)  are  dummies taking a value of 1 if the target price is associated 
with a specific recommendation and 0 otherwise. 
Overall significance for regressions is high (F=1.915,13, one-tailed p<0.01) with  an  adjusted  
R2  for  the  regression  of  43,82%. Results  show  the  implicit  return is significantly explained 
by recommendation class: the higher is the analyst opinion (i.e. strong buy, the higher is the 
implicit return associated  with  each  target  price  (0.275,  t=63.18,  one-tailed p<0.01) and vice 
versa (strong sell recommendations are negatively associated to implicit returns). 
 
Table 5  
Implicit returns and recommendation classes 
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On this original database, one filter is applied: only rated firms were selected. The filter reduces 
the original sample of 76 firms (from 98 to 22), and of 7,598 equity reports (from 10,769 to 
3,171). 
The new data set (Panel B) includes 148 rating actions performed in the period 1st January 2000 
- 31st December 2005 by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P.  
 
Table 6 (Panel B) 
Descriptive statistics on Analyst Recommendations for the Italian rated companies 
 
 
Table 6 shows the number of listed and rated firms included in the new sample, by year. The 
number of covered firms is the number of firms with at least one valid recommendation in our 
database, by year. The market capitalization of covered firms as a percent of the total market 
capitalization is the average daily ratio between the sum of the market capitalizations of all 
covered firms and the market value of all securities used in the S&PMIB daily value weighted 
indices. The sample was compiled by combining the information provided by the Bloomberg 
and DataStream databases with the information provided by the rating agencies’ websites. The 
database includes 22 continuously rated and listed Italian companies representing approximately 
36% of the overall stock market capitalization32. 
The mean of the number of analysts issuing recommendations for each covered firm is constant 
(on average 10 analyst per covered firm) by year. The last two columns of the table refer to the 
number of target prices and rating actions included the database by year.  
For each firm, we after exclude “single report companies”, i.e. companies for which only one 
equity report has been published across the time interval of analysis (between two consecutive 
rating actions). Additional information about reported companies – such as market 
capitalization, daily closing prices, P/BV, EPS, - was collected by Datastream. 
We  are motivated  in  the  selection  of  a  non-US  sample  of  target  prices  by  the uniqueness 
of Italy as the only country to require mandatory publication of any research issued  by  
authorized  financial  intermediaries. Research  activity  is  ruled  by  the  TUF  approved  by  the  
Italian  Parliament  in  1998. In 1999, CONSOB issued regulation #11971. Article 69 states that 
                                                 
32 Average 2001-2005. We refer to all the companies listed on MTA, MTAX, MTA International and ME. 
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research reports on listed companies must be sent to CONSOB and to Borsa Italiana on the day 
they are issued for immediate publication in full format on the Borsa Italiana website33.  
 
Table 7 (Panel B) 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database, 2000 to 2005 
 
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database for the Italian sample. 
The analysis concentrates on long term issuer ratings that are the agencies’ opinion of an 
obligor’s overall financial capacity to pay its financial obligations. Using information from the 
three main rating agencies is particularly important from a methodological point of view, 
avoiding any cross-agency contamination.  
The Italian data set (Panel B) includes 148 rating actions performed in the period 1st January 
2000 - 31st December 2005 by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. The columns report numbers of 
downgrades, upgrades, negative and positive outlooks and watch lists (including affirmed 
ratings) by year, by agency and by issuer type. Year 2002 is the most representative in terms of 
issued rating actions (in particular downgrades).  The rating changes by S&P (51%) exceed those 
performed by Moody’s and Fitch (respectively 25% and 24%), in line with the penetration of 
rating agencies in the Italian market. Most of the rating actions involve financial institutions 
(57% banks and insurance companies against 43% concerning industrial firms) which represent 
the majority of the rated entities in the Italian context, consistently with our previous findings 
(Panel A). 
Table 8 provides detailed evidence of downgrades and upgrades events included in our sample.  
 
 
Table 8 
Upgrades and downgrades included in the sample 
 
 
Table 9 
Rating Changes Matrix, 2000 to 2005 
 
                                                 
33 Exception  is given  to  research privately  produced  for  financial  institutions  or  specific customers which has to be 
transmitted to CONSOB and Borsa Italiana within 60 days of the issuing date. This delay is granted in order to preserve value 
for clients who pay for additional research. 
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The events consist of 13 upgrading and 36 downgrading. Among the downgrades, three rating 
actions shifted the rated entity from the investment grade to the speculative category (Table 9). 
Finally, agencies changed ratings by two notches five times (four downgrades and one upgrades) 
and once by three notches (downgrade). 
We classified rating actions according to whether they were anticipated by the inclusion in the 
watch list in the same direction. Graph 1 shows the number of rating actions by year. The trend 
of watch list alerts is highly correlated with downgrades, as watch list alerts represent reliable 
predictors of incoming/future downgrades. Overall, 23 events are classified as anticipated by a 
watch list, (55% of the downgrades and 23% of the upgrades) and 13 events are anticipated by 
an outlook (25% of the downgrades and 31% of the upgrades). In the analysis, the observations 
corresponding to an outlook removal are classified either as an upgrade or as a downgrade 
depending on whether the previous outlook is negative or positive. 
 
Graph 1 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Italian Sample 
 
 
The observations corresponding to the evolving watches are not regarded as an event on them 
but rather are used to define the following rating change as announced. 
Cases in which the action was undertaken by two or more agencies within a time span no longer 
than one week were rare (this happened 7 times), thus preventing any meaningful specific 
statistical analysis. 
Combining the information obtained from Panel A and the rating actions observed in Panel B, 
we compare the percentage of recommendation classes 'Strong Buy, 'Buy', 'Hold', 'Sell', 'Strong 
Sell' released in the four months preceding each rating action observed in the Italian data set in 
the period 1st January 2000 - 31st December 2005 and by year. Descriptive analysis is reported 
in Graphs 1-2. 
 
Graph 2 
The Italian sample: analyst recommendations consensus (2000-2005) 
 
Graph 3 
The Italian sample: analyst recommendations consensus by Year 
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Finally, given the limited numbers of Italian rating actions, we enlarge our Italian sample, adding 
42 new firms, picked from the major European stock indexes to the Italian sample: London 
FTSE 100, CAC 40 and DAX, a total of 128 new rating actions performed by S&P between 
2000 and 2005. Our final sample (Panel C: the European sample) includes 276 rating actions and 
14,046 target prices issued by 75 equity analysts, as shown in tables 10-11. 
 
 
Table 10 (Panel C) 
The European sample, 2000 to 2005 
 
 
Table 11 (Panel C) 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database, 2000 to 2005:  
The European Sample 
 
Enlarging the sample allowed us to reach a significant number of rating actions and moreover to 
observe a higher percentage of rating actions related to the industrial firms (56% vs 43% in 
Panel B).  
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3.4 Methodology 
 
According to the recent literature, rating changes include upgrades and downgrades, as well as 
positive and negative outlooks, controlling for any anticipations through watch lists.  
Taking into account the different scales given by the three main rating agencies, we first 
transform rating opinions into a cardinal scale as follows: 
 
Fitch/S&P Moody's Scale
AAA Aaa 0
AA+ Aa1 -1
AA Aa2 -2
AA- Aa3 -3
A+ A1 -4
A A2 -5
A- A3 -6
BBB+ Baa1 -7
BBB Baa2 -8
BBB- Baa3 -9
BB+ Ba1 -10
BB Ba2 -11
BB- Ba3 -12
B+ B1 -13
B B2 -14
B- B3 -15
CCC+ Caa1 -16
CCC Caa2 -17
CCC- Caa3 -18
CC Ca -19
C C -20
D/SD D/SD -21
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en
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We calculate the rating action (RA) as the difference between two consecutive rating events (R): 
 
RA= (R t+1) - Rt 
 
The variable assumes values equal to -3, -2, -1, +1 and 2, +3, according to the fact that the rating 
of the entity shifted by, respectively, -3, -2, -1, +1 , 2 and 3 notches. A ‘notch’ is defined as any 
movement in the rating. For instance a movement from Ba1 to Ba2 represents a single notch 
downgrade whereas a movement from Ba1 to Baa2 represents a two notch upgrade. 
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Similarly, the observations corresponding to an outlook (or an outlook removal) are classified 
either as an upgrade or as a downgrade depending on whether the previous outlook was positive 
or negative. 
On the basis of the collected rating actions for both samples (Italian and European Panel), we 
calculate the Average Change in Target Prices (ACTP) before each rating action in three 
different windows [-60, 0], [-90, 0] and [-120, 0] days. We concentrate our analysis on these 
intervals considering that 1) we don’t have enough observations in a shorter window (one 
month) and, conversely, 2) observing a larger window (more than four months) could have been 
misleading since it is too much overlapping with rating actions intervals.  
For each selected window we calculated the average change in target prices (ACTP) as follows: 
 
ACTP= AVERAGET (Last Target Priceij-Previous Target Priceij)/Previous Target Priceij 
 
 
Where: 
i: firms included in our sample 
j:  equity analyst 
Last target prices: issued by analyst j within the selected windows (-120;0), (-90;0), (-60;0) 
Previous target price: issued by the same analyst no longer than 6 months before the last equity report 
T: selected window 
 
Graphs 4 report the dispersion of the observed values of ACTP for each class of rating action 
for the Italian sample. As the graph shows, the average change in target prices seems to be 
correlated in signs with the corresponding rating action. ACTP is negative for downgrades, 
ranging between -40% to 10% as well as ACTP is positive in the 90 or 120 days prior a positive 
rating action, ranging from -26% to 60%. We observe the same distribution looking at the 
European sample (Graph 5). Moreover, Graphs 6 and 7 show the percentage of negative, 
positive and neutral rating actions for each ACTP(-120) range: around 80% of negative rating 
actions are preceded by negative ACTP ranging between (-50;-20%). More interesting, this 
percentage increases observing positive rating actions: strong positive ACTP ranging between 
(+20%; 50%), always precedes positive rating changes. 
 
Graphs 4-5 
Dispersion of ACTP (-90;-120) and rating actions 
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Graphs 6-7 
Range values of ACTP (-120) and rating actions 
 
These first findings support our intuition. We further test our first hypothesis by running a 
multinomial logistic data regression34.  
The characteristics of this model fit with our study. Multinomial logit model infact assumes that:  
? The dependent variable is nominal and consists of more than two discrete categories 
Multinomial logit model is a regression model which generalizes logistic regression by 
allowing more than two discrete outcomes, consistently with our dependent variable 
(rating actions) which assumes values equal to -3, -2, -1, +1 and 2; 
? The data are case specific: that is: each independent variable has a single value for each 
case; 
? The dependent variable cannot be perfectly predicted from the independent variables for 
any case; 
? There is no natural ordering in the alternatives and it is not realistic to assume that there 
is a monotonic relationship between one underlying variable and the observed outcomes; 
 
With the observed change values for RA as the dependent variable and ACTP, as the 
independent variables, we performed a multinomial logistic regression using “affirmed rating” 
(rating action=0) as the baseline group. Logistic regression estimates the probability of a certain 
event occurring (in our case rating action), given a set of dependent variables.  
Under these assumptions, we applied the following model: 
 
                                                 
34 Binomial logistic regression is a form of regression which is used when the dependent is a dichotomy and the independents are of 
any type. Multinomial logistic regression exists to handle the case of dependents with more than two classes. Continuous variables are 
not used as dependents in logistic regression. 
Logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis of continuous and/or categorical independents and 
to determine the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independents; to rank the relative importance 
of independents; to assess interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate control variables.  
Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit variable (the natural log 
of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the probability of a certain event 
occurring. 
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where for the ith observation, yi  is the observed outcome (for j= -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2) and Xi is a 
vector of explanatory variables. The unknown parameters βJ are typically estimated by maximum 
likelihood.  
 
 
3.5 Results  
 
We start testing our hypotheses by running a multinomial logit model for the Italian sample. 
Table 12 shows the results associated to each kind of rating actions using average changes in 
target prices (ACTP) as independent variable. The outcomes for the dependent variable are -3, -
2, -1, +1 and 2, to indicate all the cases in which the rating of the entity shifted by, respectively, -
3, -2, -1, +1 and 2 notches. 
The sign of the parameters for such cases is, as we expected, negative for the downward 
revisions, and positive for upward ones. This indicates that downgrades and negative outlooks 
follow negative changes in target price and, vice versa, upgrades and positive outlooks follow 
positive changes in target price. We find that using two months window, the results are not 
significant for any outcome, while using three and four months windows the results for the 
outcomes -1 and +1 – (rating action by only one notch) – are statistically significant. Our first 
findings are thus the following: 
? The parameters of the regression: in the case of the 90 day period the parameter of 
downward revisions is, in absolute value, higher than the parameter of the upward ones. The 
opposite happens in the 120 day period. 
? P. values: in the 90 day period the regression fits better for the downward revisions 
(P>│z│=0.027 against P>│z│=0.079). The opposite happens in the 120 day period 
(P>│z│=0.080 against P>│z│=0.021). This is to say that downward revisions are always 
associated with negative changes in target prices in the previous three months, but upward 
revisions may be associated with positive changes and with no or small negative changes. In the 
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four months window, instead, upward revisions are always anticipated by positive changes, while 
downward revisions may be anticipated by negative, null or small positive changes. 
 
Differences according to the selected window are consistent with the hypothesis of analysts’ 
systematic optimism in response to information, analyzed in several prior studies35. 
The evidence indicates that analysts are less likely to reduce than to increase their target price 
over time. Thus, when a negative event is to occur, they begin to cut their forecasts later than 
when increasing their forecasts in the presence of good news. This is why the cut in target price 
associated with negative events is more evident in a narrower window, closer to the rating 
action.  
The model does not achieve significant results for outcomes different from 1 and -1; this is 
basically due to the too few events associated with rating events by more than one notch. 
Tables 13 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression for outcomes (-1; 0; +1) and 
rating action equal to zero as the baseline group. The sign of the parameters for such cases is still 
negative for the downward revisions, and positive for upward ones. We find that in the first case 
(three months window) the results are statistically significant at conventional levels (5%) for 
downgrades, while using a larger window (four months) the table shows opposite results, as the 
upgrade becomes more significant. 
 
Tables 12-13 
Multinomial logistic regression: evidence from the Italian Sample 
 
 
On the basis of the data reported in tables 14-15, we generate predicted probabilities for the 
response groups while holding other variables constant at specific values. These predicted 
probabilities for the Italian sample are represented in Graphs 8-9. 
 
Tables 14-15 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the Italian 
Sample 
 
 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999). 
 79
Graphs 8-9 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the Italian 
Sample 
 
We ran the same multinomial logit model on the larger European sample (Panel C). Table 16 
shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression: ACTP is calculated over the four-month 
period that precedes each observed rating action.  
 
Table 16 
Multinomial logit model: evidence from the European Sample 
 
Compared to the Italian sample, the model keeps being highly significant for upgrades and 
positive changes of the outlooks at conventional level (1%). On the other hand, the results 
worsened for the downward revisions, as the regression is no longer significant under 10%36. As 
for the Italian sample, on the basis of the data reported in tables 17-18, we generate predicted 
probabilities for the response groups while holding other variables constant at specific values. 
These predicted probabilities for the European sample are represented in Graphs 10-11. 
 
Table 17-18 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the 
European Sample 
 
 
Graphs 10-11 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the 
European Sample 
 
In order to test the predictive power of the model for outcomes -1 and +1, we applied three 
models fit to the European Sample as reported in table 19.  
 
Tables 19-20 
Model significance and model fit 
 
Likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all population logistic regression coefficients 
except the constant are zero. Similarly, Rao's efficient score, labeled simply "score" in SPSS 
                                                 
36 Since we have still only 11 observations for revisions of more than one notch, we decide to focus only on the outcomes 1 and 
-1. 
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output, is test for whether the logistic regression coefficient for a given explanatory variable is 
zero. The Wald statistic is an alternative test which is commonly used to test the significance of 
individual logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (that is, to test the null 
hypothesis in logistic regression that a particular logit (effect) coefficient is zero. A finding of 
significance (ex., p<.05) on all the model fit leads to reject the null hypothesis that coefficients 
are zero.  
In addition, table 20 presents the results of the association of predicted probabilities and 
observed responses that we used to assess the model fit. The percent of concordant 
observations should be close to 100 (it is the percent of total number of pairs of observations 
with different outcomes, that is, in our example, one observation has outcome 0 and the other 1, 
with predicted probability (P(Y=1)) for observation with observed outcome 0 lower then 
predicted probability for observation with observed outcome 1).  
We find that the model shows an excellent predictive capacity (association of predicted probabilities 
and observed responses), the pairs of concordant elements for outcomes (-1, +1) being above 70% 
on average. 
According to our hypothesis, we investigate whether the anticipation of a rating action by an 
addition to a watch list in the same direction, may affect our results.  
The purpose of a watch list is to indicate a likely change in the company rating. Reasons for 
initiating a watch list process might be that the company has announced a major event (for 
example investment decisions), but it is unclear whether this will be realized or not; or a sudden 
change in credit quality takes place, but the extent of the change is unknown. In both cases the 
firm may be placed on the watch list. Watch list placements are accompanied by preliminary 
estimates of the rating direction. During the watch list interval, the rating agency requests 
information from the firm, thereby entering into a dialog. At the end of the watch list period, the 
rating is removed from watch list and concurrently designated as downgrade, upgrade or 
confirmation.  
In this work, we follow Hand et al. [1992] and use credit watches in two ways. First, we examine 
changes in target prices around credit watches, testing whether they contain market relevant 
information. Second, we use them as a means of distinguishing between anticipated and 
unanticipated ratings changes. 
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Overall, 47 rating actions were preceded by a watch list: 41 downgrades out of 74 (54%) and 7 
upgrades out of 28 (29%). The proportion of upgrades preceded by a watch list is considerably 
lower relative to both the total of anticipated rating actions and to the total of upgrades given 
that rating agencies often prefer to release a positive outlook rather than a positive watch, for 
upgrades (in our sample upgrades preceded by positive outlooks are 14, amounting to exactly 
50% of the total of upgrades). We expect that all the “contaminated” events should show lower 
ACTP than “not contaminated” ones. The reason underlying this belief is that analysts may have 
discounted the new event at the time of the announcement of a watch list. Conversely, if the 
release of the watch list falls into the four months before the rating action, we could register a 
greater effect on the target price due to the fact that both the impacts - relative to the watch list 
and to the rating action itself - will be included in our observation window. 
Table 21 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression for outcomes (-1; 0; +1) 
controlling for the inclusion, if any, in the watch list. Watch list is treated as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if the rating action is anticipated by a watch list, zero if the rating actions are 
not contaminated. The sign of the parameters for such cases is still negative for the downward 
revisions, and positive for upward ones. We find that the watch list is statistically significant at 
conventional levels (1%) for downgrades, not for upgrades and that the addition of watch list 
helps to better predict rating changes, as we already expected (Graphs 12-13). 
 
Table 21 
Multinomial logit model including watch list 
 
 
Graphs 12-13 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model including 
watch list 
 
 
We also compared the average change in target price for contaminated versus uncontaminated 
rating actions, and we found that contaminated downgrades show more pronounced reductions 
in target price over time while there is no significant difference for upgrades. Test statistics and 
p-values under the Mean column reflect t-tests for differences in mean ACTP rating actions 
however show that that difference between ACTP for contaminated versus uncontaminated 
events are not statistically significant at conventional levels (Table 22). 
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Table 22 
Contaminated vs. uncontaminated rating actions 
 
This difference may be explained according to whether or not the watch list was released during 
the four months prior to the rating action, corresponding to our observation window. Since 
watch lists are usually released approximately three months before the downgrade, they fall into 
our observation window, bringing with them a further reduction in target price both before and 
possibly after themselves.37 
As table the following table shows, the length of the watch list period varies considerably 
between upgrades and downgrades38.  
 
Average Max Min Median
Upgrades 5,15 15 0,4 2,42
Downgrades 3,12 10 0,5 2,67
Upgrades & Downgrades 3,46 15 0,4 2,67
Number of Months between Watch lists and Upgrades/Downgrades
 
 
Conversely, the time lag between watch lists and related upgrades is on average five months, so 
that the signals fall far from the upgrade announcements and both kinds of rating events can 
then be viewed as separate rating actions. 
In order to test the informational content of watch lists and outlooks, we finally test the 
difference between ACTP (-120) observed before these kind of rating events with the ACTP, for 
the same interval, prior to a downgrade or an upgrade.  
We find (Table 23) that differences in ACTP (-120) are always statistically significant at 
conventional levels (5% and 1% respectively between downgrades and negative outlook or 
negative watch list and at 10% level between upgrades and positive outlook or positive watch 
list). 
                                                 
37 We have already discussed the study of Goh and Ederington (1998) who report that analysts view the downgrades as having 
negative implications for the earnings forecasts since they react by revising them sharply downward after the downgrade; this 
conclusion should imply that, given the correlation between earning forecasts and target prices, analysts should also revise 
downward target prices after the downgrade. 
38 Our data is coherent with the estimates contained in the recent work of Hirsch C. and Krahnen P. J. (2007). They report that 
90% of negative watch lists takes on average 95 days to be completed, while 90% of positive watches take on average 218 days. 
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Such variability strengthens the case for assuming a poor market forecasting ability at watchlist 
and outlook initiation39, and, conversely, a higher predictive power of target prices of a clearer 
rating action (downgrade or upgrade).  
 
Table 23 
Testing ACTP (-120) for different rating actions 
 
In order to test hypothesis 4, we finally run the multinomial model controlling by the issuer’s 
sector. We split the European sample in two sub samples according to whether the issuer was a 
financial institution (118 observations) or a non financial one (147 observations). 
Looking at the European sample (which includes a larger number of corporate issuers compared 
to the Italian one) we observe that target prices reduction prior to a downgrade is highly evident 
in the financial sector while it is not clear at all for the non financial sector (Table 24). According 
to Gropp and Richards (2001) and Schweitzer et al. (1992), we observe strong differences in 
target prices trend before negative events between the two groups of issuers: the reduction of 
target price is highly evident for financial sector while it is not evident at all for the industrial one 
Conversely, the positive target price trend when upward revisions occur is evident in both cases. 
 
Table 24 
Multinomial logistic regression by sector 
 
Graphs 14-15 
Plotting of the multinomial logit model: financial vs. non financial sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Hirsch C., Krahnen J.P., A primer on rating agencies as monitors: an analysis of the watchlist period, 2007. 
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3.6 Conclusions and future research 
 
Most academic research and business press attention has been devoted to the relationship 
between rating actions and earning forecasts, or bond and stock returns, to the  effect  of  
analysts’  recommendations  on  stock returns or trading volumes, and to the accuracy of stock 
recommendations and target prices. But the ability of target  prices  to  predict  future  rating 
actions  has,  surprisingly,  remained  essentially unexplored. 
Conversely, our study contributes to the existing literature by providing an evidence of the 
predictive power of target prices prior a rating action. Moreover, our work is related to the 
empirical literature that investigates the optimism of analysts’ recommendations and we provide 
evidence about the mean target price to current price ratio for the Italian market. Using a large 
and unique database, we find that TP/P ratio over the period 2000-2005 is 1,15, that is target 
prices are 15% higher than current stock prices. 
We also provided evidence that target prices changes contain information since most 
downgrades (upgrades) are preceded by declines (increase) in target prices. 
Consequently, it is an open question whether ratings or target prices bring more information to 
the market and which is timelier. The motivation of this research stems from the empirical 
regularity that target price revisions are released much more frequently than rating actions. 
While there are more stock analysts than rating agencies and analysts focus specifically on the 
outlook for the firm’s equity, which is more volatile than debt, we expected target prices include 
more update information about the risk profile of the company. Moreover, target price are self-
contained statements incorporating stock recommendations and earning forecasts which have 
proven to be meaningfully correlated with rating actions. 
Looking at the ACTP calculated in three different intervals before each rating action, we found 
that the sign of the parameters for such cases is, as we expected, negative for the downward 
revisions, and positive for upward ones. Positive rating events are anticipated by consistent 
increases in target prices in the previous four months while is less significant the predictive 
power of target prices, for the same interval, for negative rating events. The main reason is that 
companies voluntarily release favourable information but are reluctant to release unfavourable 
information. This considerations, together with the overly-optimistic behaviour of sell-side 
analysts, should explain why target prices should adjust more fully prior to upgrades than prior 
 85
to downgrades. Results are opposite if we shorten the observation window: the evidence 
indicates that analysts are less likely to reduce than to increase their target price over time. Thus, 
when a negative event is to occur, they begin to cut their forecasts later than when increasing 
their forecasts in the presence of good news. 
Results also differ controlling by the sector. Looking at the Italian sample (composed mainly by 
financial firms) and at the European financial subsample we observe similar results: target prices 
reduction prior to a downgrade is highly evident in the financial sector while it is not clear at all 
for the non financial sector. According to Gropp and Richards (2001) and Schweitzer et al. 
(1992), we also observe strong bias between the two groups of issuers mainly due to the 
different regulatory regimes (designed respectively for financial and non financial issuers), which 
imply different degrees of transparency, and possibly to the different evaluation methods 
adopted to evaluate financial and non financial firms. 
We finally investigate whether the anticipation of a rating action by a watch list in the same 
direction, may influence our results. Comparing the average change in target price for 
contaminated versus uncontaminated rating actions, we found that contaminated downgrades 
show more pronounced reductions in target price over time while there is no significant 
difference for upgrades. This difference can be explained according to whether or not the watch 
list was released during the four months prior to the rating action, corresponding to our 
observation window. Since watch lists are usually released on average three months before the 
downgrade, they fall into our observation window, bringing with them a further reduction in 
target price.40  
Our study thus provides direct evidence of an existing relationship between target prices and 
rating actions. The documented decline in target prices prior to downgrades illustrates that some 
rating changes are at least partially anticipated (Steiner and Heinke 2001; Wansley and Clauretie 
1985). 
Another way to look at the same phenomenon would have been to look at the trend of target 
price after the rating action: we leave this study for future research.  
                                                 
40 We have already discussed the study of Goh and Ederington (1998) who report that analysts view the downgrades as having 
negative implications for the earnings forecasts since they react by revising them sharply downward after the downgrade; this 
conclusion should imply that, given the correlation between earning forecasts and target prices, analysts should also revise 
downward target prices after the downgrade. 
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Consistently with Goh and Ederington (1998), who observed abnormal returns before and after 
a rating action, possibly, Granger causality may also be observed looking at target prices: 
significant reductions in target price may follow bond rating downgrades, indicating that bond 
ratings provide support to equity research analysts’ forecasts incorporated in previous target 
prices. 
In our opinion, the problem of whether rating agencies’ decisions can also have an influence on 
the trend of stock analysts’ target prices could be important in the light of the recent decision of 
CONSOB, to amend, on May 200741. The new rule now excludes rating agencies from the 
application of the discipline about recommendations42. 
Article 114 of the Testo Unico della Finanza (TUF, 1998), within the market abuse discipline, 
stated the requirement of correct presentation of the information, besides the requirement of 
disclosure in situations of conflicts of interest. Those requirements were addressed to all the 
entities that produce and distribute research and evaluations of securities and securities’ issuers, 
as well as stock analysts (that propose investment strategies to public investors) and rating 
agencies. 
At that stage CONSOB regulation #11971 recognized the different nature of rating agencies’ 
assessments from stock analysts’ recommendations and stated a different discipline for rating 
opinions: the former article 69-decies did not establish any behavior requirements but only 
adequate disclosure, recalling the rating agencies’ self-regulation. Law # 262 (2005), article 14, c. 
1, then modified article 114 of the TUF, explicitly excluding rating agencies from the application 
of the disclosure requirements. Subsequently article 69-decies of regulation #11971, was updated 
in May 2007. The decision is based upon the fact that opinions on creditworthiness given by 
rating agencies are not recommendations but independent opinions that do not impart any 
advice to investors. We can argue that if analysts’ opinions affect investment decisions (that has 
been already proven) and they are proven to be affected by rating agencies’ assessments, 
therefore it would be necessary to restate stricter rules about the disclosure of the information 
contained in the rating opinions. 
 
                                                 
41 Regulation # 11971 (1999), art. 69-decies related to the disclosure requirements of rating agencies. 
42 Contained in articles 69, 69-bis, 69-ter, letters a), b), d), e) e f), 69-quater, 69-quinquies, c. 1, 2, letter a), and 3, 69-sexies and 69-
septies 
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Table 1 Panel A 
Descriptive statistic of companies 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the 10,769 report issued on 98 companies included in the sample. Report 
N° is the number of reports included in the final sample. 
 
Company Industry Company Industry
Aedes Financials 23 0,21% Gewiss General Industries 18 0,17%
Alitalia Cyclical services 29 0,27% Gruppo Coin Cyclical services 93 0,86%
Alleanza Financials 199 1,85% Gr. E. L'espresso Cyclical services 203 1,89%
Amga Utilities 55 0,51% Ifil General Industries 36 0,33%
Autogrill Cyclical services 212 1,97% Irce General Industries 138 1,28%
Autostrada To-Mi Cyclical services 51 0,47% It Holding Cycl. cons. goods 25 0,23%
Autostrade Cyclical services 265 2,46% Italcementi Basic Industries 39 0,36%
Banca Carige Financials 7 0,07% Italmobiliare Basic Industries 177 1,64%
Banca Fideuram Financials 158 1,47% Jolly Hotels Cyclical services 21 0,20%
Banca Intesa Financials 287 2,67% La Doria Non-Cycl. cons. goods 20 0,19%
Banca Lombarda Financials 46 0,43% Marcolin Cycl. cons. goods 30 0,28%
Banca Mps Financials 185 1,72% Marzotto Cycl. cons. goods 14 0,13%
Bnl Financials 210 1,95% Mediaset Cyclical services 167 1,55%
Bca.Ppo.Etruria Financials 15 0,14% Mediobanca Financials 332 3,08%
Bca.Ppo.Intra Financials 21 0,20% Mediolanum Financials 51 0,47%
Bca.Ppo.Lodi Financials 31 0,29% Merloni Cycl. cons. goods 211 1,96%
Bca.Ppo.Milano Financials 109 1,01% Milano Assic. Financials 54 0,50%
Benetton Cycl. cons. goods 231 2,15% Mirato Non-Cycl. cons. goods 61 0,57%
Beni Stabili Financials 84 0,78% Mondadori Ed Cyclical services 193 1,79%
Bonif.Ferraresi Non-Cycl. cons. goods 5 0,05% Navig. Montanari Cyclical services 36 0,33%
Brembo Cycl. cons. goods 131 1,22% Parmalat Non-Cycl. cons. goods 134 1,24%
Bulgari Cycl. cons. goods 331 3,07% Permasteelisa Basic Industries 99 0,92%
Buzzi Unicem Basic Industries 153 1,42% Pininfarina Cycl. cons. goods 50 0,46%
Capitalia Financials 178 1,65% Pirelli General Industries 224 2,08%
Carraro Cycl. Cons. goods 24 0,22% Poligrafici Ed. Cyclical services 13 0,12%
Cembre General Industries 22 0,20% Ras Financials 219 2,03%
Cementir Basic Industries 54 0,50% Rcs Mediagroup Cyclical services 133 1,24%
Class Editori Cyclical services 50 0,46% Recordati Non-Cycl. cons. goods 150 1,39%
Credito Emiliano Financials 88 0,82% Reno De Medici Basic Industries 37 0,34%
Cdt.Valtellines Financials 3 0,03% Rich. Ginori Basic Industries 20 0,19%
Cremonini Non-Cycl. cons. goods 80 0,74% Risanamento Financials 10 0,09%
Crespi Basic Industries 2 0,02% Sabaf General Industries 78 0,72%
Csp Intern. Cycl. cons. goods 22 0,20% Saes Getters General Industries 72 0,67%
Danieli General Industries 16 0,15% Saipem Resources 233 2,16%
Ducati Motor Hold. Cycl. cons. goods 110 1,02% San Paolo Imi Financials 298 2,77%
Edison Utilities 84 0,78% Sirti Information Technology 22 0,20%
Enel Utilities 329 3,06% Snai Cyclical services 12 0,11%
Enertad Cyclical services 17 0,16% Snia Ord Non-Cycl. cons. goods 48 0,45%
Eni Resources 320 2,97% Sogefi Cycl. cons. goods 54 0,50%
Erg Resources 144 1,34% Sol Basic Industries 20 0,19%
Ergo Previd. Financials 58 0,54% Stefanel Cycl. cons. goods 35 0,33%
Ericsson Information Technology 11 0,10% Stm Information Technology 194 1,80%
Fiat Cycl. cons. goods 311 2,89% Targetti General Industries 43 0,40%
Fin Part Cycl. cons. goods 86 0,80% Telecom Italia Non-cyclical services 370 3,44%
Finecogroup Financials 153 1,42% Telecom It. M. Information Technology 180 1,67%
Finmeccanica General Industries 5 0,05% Tim Non-cyclical services 310 2,88%
Fondiaria-Sai Financials 121 1,12% Trevi General Industries 33 0,31%
Gabetti Financials 8 0,07% Unicredito Financials 298 2,77%
Generali Financials 256 2,38% Unipol Financials 71 0,66%
Mean number or reports 109,89
Median 71,5
Standard deviation 100,21
Report N. and % Report N. and %
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Table 2 Panel A 
Summary statistics of reports by industry 
 
This table presents reports’ descriptive statistics of the final sample sorted by industry distribution. Mean coverage is 
the arithmetic mean coverage. 
 
 
 
Industry Reports Companies Mean coverage
Basic Industries 583 9 65
Cycl. Cons. Goods 1761 15 117
Cyclical services 1622 15 108
Financials 3323 29 115
General Industries 720 11 65
Information Technology 407 4 102
Non Cycl. cons. Goods 508 7 73
Non Cyclical services 680 2 340
Resources 697 3 232
Utilities 468 3 156
1076,9
9,8
Financials 
Financials 
Most represented Industry by number of report
Most represented Industry by number of companies
Average number of report per industry
Average number of companies per industry
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Table 3 Panel A 
Reports annual distribution per recommendation class 
 
This table shows total recommendations’ distribution and yearly recommendations’ distribution. The first column reports absolute and percentage report distribution per 
recommendation class over the total number of reports issued. Columns two, three four and five report absolute distribution for each year. Percentages report the relative 
number of reports issued per recommendation class over the total number of reports issued each year. 
 
 
 
Strong buy 1706 (15,8%) 246 (25,7%) 321 (18,5%) 248 (13,5%) 235 (10,1%) 358 (15,4%) 298 (12,8%)
Buy 4160 (38,6%) 406 (42,4%) 625 (36,0%) 731 (39,7%) 964 (41,4%) 756 (32,5%) 678 (29,1%)
Hold 3834 (35,6%) 254 (26,5%) 603 (34,7%) 654 (35,6%) 867 (37,2%) 754 (32,4%) 702 (30,1%)
Sell 983 (9,1%) 50 (5,2%) 172 (9,9%) 202 (11,0%) 253 (10,9%) 145 (6,2%) 161 (6,9%)
Strong sell 86 (0,8%) 2 (0,2%) 17 (1,0%) 4 (0,2%) 10 (0,4%) 1 (0,0%) 52 (2,2%)
TOTAL 10.769 (100,0%) 958 (100,0%) 1.738 (100,0%) 1.839 (100,0%) 2.329 (100,0%) 2.014 (100,0%) 1.891 (100,0%)
2004 20052003TOTAL 2000 2001 2002
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Table 4 Panel A 
Relative Optimism in Target Prices across Stock Recommendations 
 
This table presents the distribution of target prices (TP) for all the Italian Sample, issued between 1st January 2000 - 
31st December 2005, scaled by actual price (P) for the reports collected. Share trading price is obtained from 
Datastream, and reflects the closing share price on the trading day just preceding the date of the stock 
recommendation. Test of differences are shown in the bottom section of the table and are one-sided tests for the 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) predicting that more favourable recommendations are justified by a higher ratio, TP/P. 
Test statistics and p-values under the Mean column reflect t-tests for differences in mean TP/P between adjacent 
recommendations categories 
 
 
% Observ Mean Dev.Std Minimum Median Maximum
Strong Buy 17% 1,34 0,19 0,91 1,29 2,72
Buy 40% 1,20 0,13 0,62 1,17 3,36
Hold 34% 1,06 0,13 0,25 1,05 2,80
Sell 8% 0,90 0,13 0,37 0,91 1,52
Strong Sell 1% 0,69 0,16 0,33 0,72 1,01
All 1,15 0,14 0,25 1,12 3,36
HA: Strong Buy> Buy?
test statistic 26,74
(p-value) (0.000)***
HA: Buy> Hold?
test statistic 43,4
(p-value) (0.000)***
HA: Hold> Sell?
test statistic 30,76
(p-value) (0.000)***
HA: Sell> Strong Sell?
test statistic 13,8
(p-value) (0.000)***
TP/P
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Table 5 Panel A 
Implicit returns and recommendation classes 
 
This table provides evidence on the effect on the implicit return (TPt0/Pt0) of each recommendation class. We 
regress the implicit return expressed by target price at the time of report publication on 4 dummy variables 
representing  the  recommendation classes 'Strong Buy, 'Buy', 'Sell', 'Strong Sell'. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is denoted by *,**,***  respectively. 
 
 
 
TP/P
Dependent Variable Coefficient T-stat
Intercept 1.060*** 419.63
Strong buy 0.275*** 63.18
Buy 0.137*** 39.77
Sell -0.159*** -28.15
Strong sell -0.374*** -23.22
Adj R2 0.4382
Std. Error of Estimate 0.1458
F-Statistic (Significance Level)
1915.13***  
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Table 6 Panel B 
Descriptive statistics on Analyst Recommendations for the Italian rated companies, 2000 to 2005 
 
 
The number of listed firms includes all firms listed on Milan stock exchange, by year. The number of covered firms is the number of firms with at least one valid 
recommendation in our database, by year. The market capitalization of covered firms as a percent of the total market capitalization is the average daily ratio between the 
sum of the market capitalizations of all covered firms and the market value of all securities used in the S&PMIB daily value weighted indices. The mean and median 
number of analysts issuing recommendations for each covered firm is shown, as is the mean and median number of firms covered by each analyst in the database, by year. 
This is followed by the number of brokerage houses and number of analysts with at least one recommendation during the year. The last two columns refer to the number 
of target prices and rating actions included the database for the year. The database includes 22 continuously rated and listed Italian companies representing approximately 
36% of the overall stock market capitalization. 
 
 
 
Year
N.of Listed 
firms
N. of covered 
firms
As a % of listed 
firms
Market cap       
(€ mil)
Market cap as 
% of Market
N. of 
analysts Mean Median
N. Target 
prices
Rating 
actions
2000 297 17 6% 818.384                 30% 19 4,48 5,00 190 12
2001 294 23 8% 592.319                 35% 26 9,30 9,00 466 14
2002 295 23 8% 457.992                 34% 34 10,00 8,00 501 43
2003 279 23 8% 447.486                 36% 33 10,78 11,00 650 31
2004 278 23 8% 580.881                 34% 28 10,04 9,00 590 18
2005 282 22 8% 676.606                 36% 26 10,00 10,00 774 30
Total 3.171 148
Covered Firms Analysts 
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Table 7 Panel B 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database, 2000 to 2005- the Italian sample 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database for the Italian sample. The Italian data set (Panel B) includes 148 rating actions performed in the 
period 1st January 2000 - 31st December 2005 by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. The columns report numbers of downgrades, upgrades, negative and positive outlooks and 
watch lists (including affirmed ratings) by year, by agency and by issuer type. Year 2002 is the most representative in terms of issued rating actions (in particular 
downgrades).  The rating changes by S&P (51%) exceed those performed by Moody’s and Fitch (respectively 25% and 24%), in line with the penetration of rating agencies 
in the Italian market. Most of the rating actions involve financial institutions (57% banks and insurance companies against 43% concerning industrial firms) which 
represent the majority of the rated entities in the Italian context. 
 
 
 
Year Downgrades Upgrades Positive Outlooks Negative Outlooks Negative Watches Positive Watches Total %
2000 1 3 5 2 1 0 12 8%
2001 5 1 2 3 3 0 14 9%
2002 13 2 6 17 3 2 43 29%
2003 10 0 13 5 2 1 31 21%
2004 1 2 11 4 0 0 18 12%
2005 6 5 8 3 6 2 30 20%
Total 36 13 45 34 15 5 148 100%
Agency Downgrades Upgrades Positive Outlooks Negative Outlooks Negative Watches Positive Watches Total %
Fitch 11 1 9 8 4 2 35 24%
Moody's 10 4 10 11 2 0 37 25%
S&P 15 8 26 15 9 3 76 51%
Total 36 13 45 34 15 5 148 100%
Type Downgrades Upgrades Positive Outlooks Negative Outlooks Negative Watches Positive Watches Total %
Financial 19 11 30 12 9 3 84 57%
Corporate 17 2 15 22 6 2 64 43%
Total 36 13 45 34 15 5 148 100%
BY YEAR
BY AGENCY
BY ISSUER TYPE
Distribution of rating actions
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Graph 1 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Italian Sample 
 
This table shows the number of rating actions by year. The trend of watch list alerts is highly correlated with 
downgrades, as watchlist alerts represent reliable predictors of incoming/future downgrades. 
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Graphs 2-3 
The Italian sample: analyst recommendations consensus (2000-2005) and by year 
 
This graph shows the percentage of recommendation classes 'Strong Buy, 'Buy', 'Hold', 'Sell', 'Strong Sell' released in 
the four months preceding each rating action observed in the Italian data set in the period 1st January 2000 - 31st 
December 2005. The percentage of recommendation classes released in the four months preceding each rating 
action observed in the Italian data set by year is reported below, in graph 3. 
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Table 8 Panel B 
Upgrade and downgrade included in the sample 
 
This table presents the description of the events, taking into account only rating actions of downgrade and upgrade 
(excluding changes of outlook), and the characteristic of these events, in chronological order. The sample consists 
of 13 upgrading and 36 downgrading. 
 
 
Date Issuer Sector Rating Agency IG Previous rating Following Rating Direction
08/08/2003 Assicurazioni Generali Banking M 1 Aa3 A1 Downgrade
13/11/2002 Banca Intesa SpA Banking S 1 A A- Downgrade
06/09/2004 Banca Intesa SpA Banking S 1 A- A Upgrade
00/01/1900 Banca Intesa SpA Banking S 1 A A+ Upgrade
08/08/2000 BNL Banking S 1 BBB BBB+ Upgrade
04/11/2002 Banca Popolare Intra Banking F 1 A- BBB+ Downgrade
19/06/2003 Banca Popolare Intra Banking S 1 BBB+ BBB Downgrade
00/01/1900 Banca Popolare Intra Banking S 1 BBB BBB- Downgrade
00/01/1900 Banca Popolare Intra Banking F 1 BBB+ BBB- Downgrade
07/07/2003 Banca Popolare Italiana Banking M 1 A3 Baa1 Downgrade
05/02/2004 Banca Popolare Italiana Banking F 1 A- BBB+ Downgrade
21/06/2001 Banca Popolare Milano Banking S 1 A A- Downgrade
28/03/2002 Banca Popolare Milano Banking F 1 A A- Downgrade
12/09/2002 Banca Popolare Milano Banking M 1 A2 A3 Downgrade
01/08/2000 Capitalia Banking M 1 A3 A2 Upgrade
20/09/2005 Capitalia Banking F 1 BBB+ A- Upgrade
24/01/2003 Edison Corporate M 1 Baa2 Baa3 Downgrade
29/07/2004 Edison Corporate S 1 BBB BBB+ Upgrade
14/11/2005 Edison Corporate M 1 Baa3 Baa2 Upgrade
12/07/2002 Enel Corporate M 1 Aa3 A1 Downgrade
28/02/2003 Enel Corporate F 1 AA- A+ Downgrade
18/04/2001 Fiat Corporate M 1 Baa1 Baa2 Downgrade
11/12/2001 Fiat Corporate F 1 A- BBB Downgrade**
26/06/2002 Fiat Corporate M 1 Baa2 Baa3 Downgrade
15/11/2002 Fiat Corporate F 1 BBB BBB- Downgrade
23/12/2002 Fiat Corporate M 0 Baa3 Ba1 Downgrade
04/03/2003 Fiat Corporate F 0 BBB- BB+ Downgrade
07/07/2003 Fiat Corporate M 0 Ba1 Ba3 Downgrade**
08/07/2003 Fiat Corporate F 0 BB+ BB Downgrade
11/07/2003 Fiat Corporate S 0 BB+ BB- Downgrade**
15/09/2004 Fiat Corporate F 0 BB BB- Downgrade
06/10/2000 Fondiaria SAI Banking S 1 AA- A+ Downgrade
13/11/2001 Fondiaria SAI Banking S 1 A+ A- Downgrade**
11/09/2002 Fondiaria SAI Banking S 1 A- BBB- Downgrade***
09/08/2005 Fondiaria SAI Banking S 1 BBB- BBB Upgrade
30/06/2003 Ifil Banking S 1 A A- Downgrade
26/10/2005 Ifil Banking S 1 A- BBB+ Downgrade
23/11/2001 Milano Assicurazioni Banking S 1 BBB A- Upgrade**
09/08/2005 Milano Assicurazioni Banking S 1 BBB- BBB Upgrade
03/06/2002 Reno de Medici Corporate S 0 BBB- BB+ Downgrade
15/11/2002 Reno de Medici Corporate S 0 BB+ BB Downgrade
01/06/2005 Reno de Medici Corporate S 0 B+ B Downgrade
04/04/2000 San Paolo IMI Banking M 1 A1 Aa3 Upgrade
12/08/2003 Telecom Italia Corporate M 1 Baa1 Baa2 Downgrade
03/07/2002 Unicredito Italiano Banking S 1 A+ AA- Upgrade
04/11/2002 Unicredito Italiano Banking M 1 Aa3 Aa2 Upgrade
28/10/2005 Unicredito Italiano Banking S 1 AA- A+ Downgrade
28/10/2005 Unicredito Italiano Banking F 1 AA- A+ Downgrade
22/10/2003 Unipol Banking S 1 A A- Downgrade
*** by three notches
** by two notches  
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Table 9 Panel B 
Rating Changes Matrix, 2000 to 2005 
 
 
This table presents descriptive evidence on the magnitude of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch rating changes for the full sample of 49 observations between 01/01/2000 and 
31/12/2005. Rows represent the original rating assigned by the agency, columns represent the new rating assigned after the change, and the number in each cell represents 
the number of observations that have the respective old and new rating. Red values represent the number of cases in which the rating change causes the shift from an 
investment grade class to a speculative one and vice versa. The proportion of downgrades (and upgrades) to total within-class rating changes is presented in the panel 
below the main table. 
  
 
 
A A+ A- A1 A3 AA- Aa2 Aa3 B B+ BB BB+ BB- BBB BBB+ BBB- Ba1 Ba3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
A 1 5
A+ 1 1
A- 1 4 1**
A1 1
A2 1
A3 1
AA- 4
Aa3 2 1
B+ 1
BB 1 1
BB+ 2 1
BBB 1 2 2
BBB+ 1 1 1
BBB- 2* 2
Ba1 1
Baa1 2
Baa2 2
Baa3 1* 1
Total 1 5 8 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 6 4 1 1 1 3 2
Downgrades(%) 80% 75% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 33% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100% 67% 100%
Upgrades (%) 100% 20% 25% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0%
From IG to SG:
*    Fiat:  23 rd December, 2002
     Fiat:  4 th March, 2003
     Reno de Medici: 3 rd June, 2002
New rating
O
l
d
 
R
a
t
i
n
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Table 10 Panel C 
Descriptive statistic of European companies  
 
The table shows descriptive statistics of the 65 listed and rated companies included in the European sample. The type refers to the sector (F=Financial; I= Industrial). 
 
 
Francia Type Germania Type UK Type Italia Type
AXA S.A. F Bayer AG I Aviva PLC F Banca fideuram F
BNP Paribas S.A. F Commerzbank AG F BAE Systems PLC I Banca Intesa F
Capgemini F Continental AG I British Airways PLC I Banca Lombarda F
Carrefour S.A. I Deutsche Bank AG F British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC I Banca Monte dei Paschi F
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain S.A. I Deutsche Lufthansa AG I Carnival PLC I BNL F
Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin I Deutsche Postbank AG F Diageo PLC I Banca popolare intra F
Credit Agricole S.A. F Deutsche Telekom AG I HSBC Holdings PLC F Banca popolare italiana F
France Telecom I E.ON AG I ITV PLC I Banca popolare milano F
Lafarge S.A. I Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA I Northern Rock PLC F Capitalia F
Renault S.A. I Linde AG I Prudential PLC F Edison I
Societe Generale F Siemens AG I Reuters Group PLC I Enel I
SUEZ I ThyssenKrupp AG I Standard Chartered PLC F Fiat I
Thomson France I United Utilities PLC I Fineco F
Vinci SA I Vodafone Group PLC I Generali F
Vivendi I WPP Group PLC I Fondiaria - Sai F
Ifil F
Mediobanca F
Milano Assicurazioni F
Reno de Medici I
San paolo Imi F
Telecom I
Unicredito Italiano F
Unipol F  
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Table 11 Panel C 
Descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database, 2000 to 2005: the European Sample 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics on rating actions from the Database for the European sample. The European data set (Panel C) includes 128 new rating actions (as a 
total of 276 overall rating actions) performed in the period 1st January 2000 - 31st December 2005 by S&P in Germany, UK and France. 
 
 
 
 
Country Target Prices Rating Actions Firms Financials Industrials Analysts
Italy 3.206 148 23 18 5 42
United Kingdom 2.899 38 15 5 10 73
France 5.130 52 15 4 11 70
Germany 2.811 38 12 3 9 13
Total 14.046 276 65 30 35 75
Year Downgrade Upgrade Positive Outlook Negative Outlook Negative Watch Positive Watch Total
Italy 36 13 45 34 15 5 148 54%
Germany 11 4 6 8 7 2 38 14%
France 13 7 12 8 8 4 52 19%
United Kingdom 14 4 6 6 5 3 38 14%
Total 74 28 69 56 35 14 276 100%
Agency Downgrade Upgrade Positive Outlook Negative Outlook Negative Watch Positive Watch Total
Fitch 11 1 9 8 4 2 35 13%
Moody's 10 4 10 11 2 0 37 13%
S&P 53 23 50 37 29 12 204 74%
Total 74 28 69 56 35 14 276 100%
Type Downgrade Upgrade Positive Outlook Negative Outlook Negative Watch Positive Watch Total
Financial 27 12 39 28 13 3 122 44%
Corporate 47 16 30 28 22 11 154 56%
Total 74 28 69 56 35 14 276 100%
BY COUNTRY
BY AGENCY
BY ISSUER TYPE
 106
Graphs 4-5 
Dispersion of ACTP (-120) and rating actions 
 
These graphs show the dispersion of the observed values of ACTP (120 days) for each class of rating action (-3, -2, 
-1, 0, +1, +2) 
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Graphs 6-7 
Range values of ACTP (-120) and rating actions 
 
These graphs show the percentage of negative, positive and neutral rating actions for each ACTP (-120) range. 
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Table 12 
Multinomial logistic regression: evidence from the Italian Sample 
 
This table presents the results of how rating actions can be anticipated by changes in target prices, by running a 
multinomial logistic data regressions , which has outcomes -3, -2, -1, +1 and 2, to indicate all the cases in which the 
rating of the entity shifted by, respectively, -3, -2, -1, +1 and 2 notches. Multinomial logistic regression is the 
extension for the (binary) logistic regression (1) when the categorical dependent outcome has more than two levels. 
We perform a multinomial logistic regression using “affirmed ratings” (rating action=0) as the baseline group. 
Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit variable 
(the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the 
probability of a certain event (rating action) occurring. The sign of the parameters for such cases is, as we expected, 
negative for the downward revisions, and positive for upward ones. This indicates that downgrades and negative 
outlooks follow negative changes in target price and, vice versa, upgrades and positive outlooks follow positive 
changes in target price. We find that in the first case (two months window) the results are not significant for any 
outcome, while in the second and in the third case (three and four months windows) the results for the outcomes -1 
and +1 – (rating action by only one notch) – are statistically significant. The model does not achieve significant 
results for outcomes different from 1 and -1; this is basically due to the too few events associated with rating events 
by more than one notch. 
 
 
 
 
Indipendent variables -3 -2 -1 1 2
ACTP 60 days -0,012 -0,019 -0,0095 0,012 -0,014
(0,737) (0,342) (0,29) (0,183) (0,595)
Intercept -2,41 -0,748 1,64 0,31 -1,63
(0,201) (0,445) (0,002)*** (0,590) (0,226)
Pseudo R2 0,0362
Chi 2 12,74**
ACTP 90 days -12,72 -13,12 -5,34 4,4 2,62
(0,163) (0,011)*** (0,027)** (0,079)* (0,695)
Intercept -4,42 -3,11 0,85 1,04 -2,27
(0,030)** (0,004)*** (0,003)*** (0,000)*** (0,002)***
Pseudo R2 0,1115
Chi 2 39,26***
ACTP 120 days -9,78 -10,02 -4,05 5,87 4,72
(0,186) (0,019)** (0,080)* (0,021)** (0,473)
Intercept -4,1 -2,77 0,9 1,06 -2,24
(0,018)** (0,003)*** (0,002)*** (0,000)*** (0,003)***
Pseudo R2 0,1118
Chi 2 39,34***
N.observations 148
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% levels respectively
Rating actions
Downgrades Upgrades
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Table 13 
Multinomial logit model: evidence from the Italian Sample 
 
These tables present the results of the multinomial logistic regression for outcomes (-1; 0; +1) and rating action equal to zero as the baseline group. The sign of the 
parameters for such cases is still negative for the downward revisions, and positive for upward ones. We find that in the first case (three months window) the results are 
statistically significant at conventional levels (5%) for downgrades, while using a larger window (four months) the table shows opposite results, as the upgrade becomes 
more significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade
Indipendent variables -1 1 Indipendent variables -1 1
ACTP -90 -5,15 4,29 ACTP - 120 -3,83 5,70
(0,030)** (0,083)* (0,090)* (0,023)**
Intercept 0,86 1,04 Intercept 0,92 1,06
(0,002)*** (0,000)*** (0,001)*** (0,000)***
Pseudo R2 0,1069 Pseudo R2 0,1096
Chi 2 30,17*** Chi 2 30,93***
N.observations 141 N.observations 141
Rating actionRating action
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Tables 14-15 
Plotting of the multinomial logit model: the Italian Sample 
 
On the basis of this data, we generate predicted probabilities for the response groups while holding other variables 
constant at specific values.  
 
 
 
 
 
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-90)
_cons 0,86 1,04 -0,04
ACTP (-90) -5,15 4,29
2,88 2,40
y = Pr(rating actions) 46% 38%
dy/dx -2,03 1,92
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (-90) 141 -0,04 0,13 -0,39 0,59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-120)
_cons 0,92 1,06 -0,04
ACTP (-120) -3,83 5,70
2,90 2,33
y = Pr(rating action) 47% 37%
dy/dx -1,95 2,00
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (-120) 141 -0,04 0,14 -0,51 0,59  
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Graphs 8-9 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the Italian Sample 
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Table 16 
Multinomial logit model: evidence from the European Sample 
 
This table shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression applied to the larger European sample. ACTP is calculated over the three and four-month period that 
precedes each observed rating action. Compared to the Italian sample, the model keeps being highly significant for upgrades and positive changes of the outlooks at 
conventional level (1%). The results instead worsened for the downward revisions. The sign of the parameters is negative for the downward revisions, and positive for 
upward ones. Using a 90-day period instead of a 120-day one, ACTP becomes statistically significant for downgrades at conventional levels (5%). 
 
 
 
 
Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade
Indipendent variables -1 1 Indipendent variables -1 1
ACTP - 120 days -2,42 7,54 ACTP - 90 days -2,86 6,44
(0,10)* (0,000)*** (0,060)* (0,000)***
Intercept 0,76 0,68 Intercept 0,75 0,67
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)***
Pseudo R2 0,0936 Pseudo R2 0,086
Chi 2 51,44*** Chi 2 47,27***
N.observations 265 N.observations 265
Rating action Rating action
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Tables 17-18 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the European 
Sample 
 
The graph shows the predicted probabilities for the European sample. We generate predicted probabilities for the 
response groups while holding other variables constant at specific values. These predicted probabilities for the 
European sample are represented in the following graphs. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (- 90) 265 -0,03 0,12 -0,39 0,59
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-90)
_cons 0,75 0,67 -0,03
ACTP (- 90) -2,86 6,44
2,31 1,60
y = Pr(rating action) 47% 33%
dy/dx -1,70 1,85  
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (-120) 265 -0,03 0,13 -0,51 0,59
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-120)
_cons 0,76 0,69 -0,03
ACTP (-120) -2,42 7,55
2,32 1,56
y = Pr(rating action) 48% 32%
dy/dx -1,75 2,01  
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Graphs 10-11 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model for the European 
Sample 
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Table 19 
Model significance and model fit: is the model with the independent variables included significantly better then a model with just intercept? 
 
This table presents the measures of three models fit applied to the European Sample. Likelihood ratio tests the null hypothesis that all population logistic regression coefficients 
except the constant are zero. Similarly, Rao's efficient score, labelled simply "score" in SPSS output, is test for whether the logistic regression coefficient for a given explanatory 
variable is zero. The Wald statistic is an alternative test which is commonly used to test the significance of individual logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable 
(that is, to test the null hypothesis in logistic regression that a particular logit (effect) coefficient is zero. A finding of significance (ex., p<.05) on all the model fit  leads to reject the 
null hypothesis that coefficients are zero. 
 
 
 
Test χ2 (Chi-square) DF Pr > ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio 459.717 1 <.0001
Score 412.697 1 <.0001
Wald 356.746 1 <.0001
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20 
How well does the model fit the data? Association of predicted probabilities and observed responses 
 
This table presents the results of the association of predicted probabilities and observed responses that we used to assess the model fit. We find that the model fits well with 
upgrades and downgrades (% of concordant observations equal to 70%) but not for rating action equal to zero, where the % of concordant is equal to 0%. 
 
 
 
FROM 1 0 -1 Total % Discordant %  Concordant
1 66 0 28 94 30% 70%
0 18 0 31 49 100% 0%
-1 30 0 92 122 25% 75%
INTO
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Table 21 
Multinomial logit model including watch list 
 
In these table we run the multinomial logistic regression for outcomes (-1; 0; +1) controlling for the addition in the watch list. 
Watch list is treated as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the rating action is anticipated by a watch list, zero if the rating 
actions are not contaminated. The sign of the parameters for such cases is still negative for the downward revisions, and positive 
for upward ones. We find that the watch list is statistically significant at conventional levels (1%) for downgrades, not for 
upgrades. 
 
 
 
The Italian sample
Downgrade Upgrade
-1 1
ACTP 120 days -5,45 5,05
(0,043)** (0,054)*
Watch list 2,95 0,85
(0,000)*** (0,081)*
Intercept 1,16 1,38
(0,002)*** (0,000)***
Pseudo R2 0,2582
Chi 2 72,86***
N.observations 141
Rating action
 
 
 
 
The European sample
Downgrade Upgrade
Indipendent variables -1 1
ACTP 120 days -3,83 7,37
(0,035)** (0,000)***
Watch list 2,18 0,46
(0,000)*** (0,155)
Intercept 0,84 0,84
(0,000)*** (0,000)***
Pseudo R2 0,2157
Chi 2 118,56***
N.observations 265
Rating action
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Graphs 12-13 
Plotting predicted probabilities estimated in the multinomial logit model including watch list 
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The Italian sample Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1)
_cons 1,16 1,38
ACTP (-120) -5,45 5,04
3,91 3,30
y = Pr(rating action) 48% 40%
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TheEuropean sample Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1)
_cons 0,84 0,84
ACTP (-120) -3,83 7,37
2,63 1,82
y = Pr(rating action) 48% 33%
dy/dx -2,15 2,26  
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Table 22 
Contaminated vs. uncontaminated rating actions 
 
In this table we compared the average change in target price for contaminated versus uncontaminated rating 
actions. Test statistics and p-values under the mean column reflect t-tests for differences in mean ACTP rating 
actions categories. 
 
Contaminated RA Uncontaminated RA
Downgrades -10,98% -8,92%
Upgrades 4,54% 4,66%
Contaminated RA Uncontaminated RA
Downgrades 41 33
Upgrades 7 21
Ha:D contamined<D uncontamined?
T-test -0,7217
p-value (0,2364)
Ha:U contamined>U uncontamined?
T-test -0,0693
p-value (0,5274)
Number
ACTP (-120)
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Table 23 
Testing ACTP (-120) for different rating actions 
 
In this table we compared the average change in target price for different typologies of rating actions. Test statistics 
and p-values under the Mean column reflect t-tests for differences in mean ACTP rating actions categories 
 
 
Average Median Max Min
Negative Outlooks -6,05% -4,14% 14,12% -37,14%
Positive Outlooks 1,89% 2,38% 58,93% -32,25%
Negative Watch Lists -4,51% -4,74% 15,22% -36,14%
Positive Watch lists 1,87% 6,69% 15,22% -19,95%
Downgrades -10,36% -7,27% 15,68% -50,57%
Upgrades 4,63% 3,76% 24,50% -5,56%
Ha: Downgrades > Negative Outlook?
t-test -2,0361
p-value (0,0219)**
Ha: Downgrades > Negative Watch List?
t-test -2,6081
p-value (0,0051)***
Ha: Upgrades > Positive Outlook?
t-test 1,4901
p-value (0,0698)*
Ha: Upgrades > Positive Watch List?
t-test 1,4651
p-value (0,0754)*
Ha: Negative watch list > Negative outlook?
t-test 0,6953
p-value (0,48)
Ha: Positive watch list > Positive outlook?
t-test -0,3911
p-value (0,65)
Average change in Target Price [-120;0]
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Table 24 
Multinomial logistic regression by sector 
 
This table shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression controlling by issuer sector. We split the observations according to whether covered firms referred to the 
financial or non financial sector. We find that while ACTP is statistically significant in predicting upgrades for both the sub samples, ACTP is statistically significant in 
predicting downgrades at conventional levels (5%) only for the financial sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade
Indipendent variables -1 1 Indipendent variables -1 1
ACTP -120 days -7,06 6,22 ACTP -120 days -0,55 6,91
(0,023)** (0,054)* (0,758) (0,004)***
Intercept 0,93 1,09 Intercept 0,67 0,39
(0,003)*** (0,000)*** (0,005)*** (0,115)
Pseudo R2 0,1623 Pseudo R2 0,0554
Chi 2 37,74*** Chi 2 17,17***
N.observations 118 N.observations 147
Rating action Rating action
Financial sector Non Financial sector
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Graph 14 
Plotting of the multinomial logit model: financial sector 
 
The graph shows the predicted probabilities estimated for the financial sector 
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Type: Financial
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (-120) 118 -0,02 0,12 -0,51 0,25
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-120)
_cons 0,93 1,09 -0,02
ACTP (-120) -7,06 6,22
2,97 2,59
y = Pr(rating action) 45% 39%
dy/dx -2,86 2,75  
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Graph 15 
Plotting of the multinomial logit model: non financial sector 
 
The graph shows the predicted probabilities estimated for the non financial sector 
 
 
The European sample: Non-Financial sector
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Type: Industrial
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACTP (-120) 147 -0,04 0,13 -0,39 0,59
Rating action (-1) Rating action (+1) ACTP (-120)
_cons 0,67 0,39 -0,04
ACTP (-120) -0,55 6,91
2,00 1,12
y = Pr(rating action) 49% 27%
dy/dx -1,05 1,44  
